Justifying Compensation by the International Criminal Court\u27s Victims Trust Fund:  Lessons from Domestic Compensation Schemes by Megret, Frederic
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 36 | Issue 1 Article 3
2010
Justifying Compensation by the International
Criminal Court's Victims Trust Fund: Lessons
from Domestic Compensation Schemes
Frederic Megret
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Frederic Megret, Justifying Compensation by the International Criminal Court's Victims Trust Fund: Lessons from Domestic Compensation
Schemes, 36 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2010).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol36/iss1/3
JUSTIFYING COMPENSATION BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S 
VICTIMS TRUST FUND: LESSONS FROM 
DOMESTIC COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
Frédéric Mégret, PhD* 
 
Introduction ................................................................................. 124 
I. The ICC and Domestic Victim Compensation Schemes: Basic 
Analogy and Issues ..................................................................... 130 
A. The Emergence and Record of Domestic Victim 
Compensation Schemes .......................................................... 130 
B. The Rome Statute’s Victims Compensation Regime: A Brief 
Overview ................................................................................. 137 
II. In Search of a Rationale: What is the TFV’s Fundamental 
Justification? ............................................................................... 143 
A. Criminal Justice Rationale: The TFV as a Corrective to the 
Limitations of Retributive Justice ........................................... 143 
B. Political Rationale: The TFV as a By-Product of Interest . 152 
C. Consequentialist Rationale: The TFV and Transitions ...... 156 
D. Practical Rationale: the TFV as a Substitute to Other 
Mechanisms ............................................................................ 163 
E. Legal Rationale: The TFV as an Admission of Responsibility
................................................................................................. 170 
F. Rights Rationale: The TFV and the Right to Reparation 
and/or Assistance .................................................................... 173 
                                                                                                             
 *  Frédéric Mégret is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law, McGill Universi-
ty and the Canada Research Chair in the Law of Human Rights and Legal Pluralism. He 
is also the Director of the McGill International Criminal Law Clinic. The author would 
like to thank Allison Rhoades for invaluable assistance, as well as Jennifer Besner and 
Michael Bookman. Jean-Baptiste Jeangène-Vilmer first focused my interest on this issue. 
I am grateful to students from my international criminal law seminar for their comments, 
especially Benoît Mayer and Bianca Baldo. The ideas contained in the Article were first 
mooted at a Grotius Centre Marie Curie Top Summer School and Bilingual Summer 
School of International Criminal Law, at a Hague Academy for International Law Semi-
nar for Advanced Studies, and at conferences organized by the Centre international de 
criminology comparée, the Centre de recherche en éthique and the Centre de recherche en 
droit public, all of the Université de Montréal. I am grateful to, respectively, Carsten 
Stahn, Samantha Besson, Jo-Anne Wemmers and Ryoa Chung for the invitations.Thanks 
also to Connor McCarthy for encouraging me to submit this. Funding was provided by 
the Québec Fonds de recherche sur la société et la culture. 
124 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
G. Political Theory Rationale: The TFV as Honoring a Social 
Contract ................................................................................... 178 
H. Humanitarian Rationale: the TFV as a “Public Charity” ... 183 
I. Moral and Equitable Rationale: The TFV as Redresser of 
Imbalances .............................................................................. 187 
J. Welfarist Rationale: The TFV as an Expression of Solidarity
................................................................................................. 192 
Conclusion .................................................................................. 201 
 
INTRODUCTION 
he International Criminal Court (ICC) has been hailed as the first 
international criminal tribunal to give serious consideration to the 
role of victims.1 In particular, the Rome Statute proposes to set up a 
complex victim compensation system, involving the Court itself but also 
a more intriguing body, the Trust Fund for Victims (“TFV”).2 What 
should such a system be doing exactly, who will pay for it and, most im-
portantly, what should be its rationale? 
The Rome Statute stands for an unprecedented attention to this dimen-
sion of criminal justice, after much neglect internationally. The Court 
can, for the first time in the history of international criminal justice, order 
money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture to be paid 
to victims.3 This part of what the ICC can do, although novel by the 
standards of international criminal law, is perhaps the most familiar to 
both criminal and international lawyers. For international lawyers, issues 
of reparation evoke elements of thinking that have long been a hallmark 
of state responsibility. For criminal lawyers, the idea of the individual 
being ordered to pay reparations is evocative of an evolution towards 
restorative justice that has also become quite significant in many jurisdic-
tions around the world.4 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Sam Garkawe, Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major 
Issues, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 345, 352 (2003). 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 79, opened for signature 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 3. Id. arts. 77.2, 79.2. 
 4. Burt Galaway & Leonard Rutman, Victim Compensation: An Analysis of Substan-
tive Issues, 48 SOC. SERV. REV. 60, 60 (1974); see also Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson, 
Introduction to CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND RECONCILIATION 1, 1–3 (Burt Ga-
laway & Joe Hudson eds., 1990). See generally DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS 
STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE (1997) (discussing the underpinnings of restorative justice 
and its applications to the criminal justice system). 
T 
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But the Rome Statute presents a system of victim compensation that 
goes far beyond simply allowing the Court to order reparation awards 
against those convicted. One might describe this complexity as a double 
hybrid. The system is hybrid, first, because the Rome Statute creates not 
one but two institutions, the Court and the TFV. Typically less attention 
has been paid to the TFV, a new institution that, though independent, 
bears many organic links to the Court. The TFV is headed by the Execu-
tive Director of the Secretariat, André Laperrière, and a five-member 
Board of Directors.5 It has been shrouded in relative mystery: its exis-
tence is anticipated by a single article in the Rome Statute,6 its regula-
tions took a long time to be adopted by the Assembly of State Parties, 
and it has been quite discrete about its activities, to the point of keeping 
its “strategic plan”7 confidential for a long time. 
Second, perhaps the core characteristic of the TFV is that it is itself a 
hybrid mechanism. On the one hand, it operates like an occasional ad-
junct to the ICC, whenever the Court will decide (and it need not always 
or often decide) that because not all victims have been identified, or be-
cause there are too many of them, it is more opportune to instruct the 
Fund to administer reparation orders.8 In that respect, the TFV acts as a 
sort of implementing agency, a para-judicial administration acting under 
close scrutiny of the Court. Its prevailing logic, as an adjunct of the 
Court, is that of reparations. 
On the other hand, the TFV also has a very crucial autonomous role 
that is largely independent from the operation of the ICC. This role is 
characterized by a different source of monies, different beneficiaries, and 
a different logic for dispensation. The TFV receives “voluntary contribu-
tions from governments, international organizations, individuals, [and] 
corporations,”9 which are stored in a separate account from that of Court 
                                                                                                             
 5. Who We Are, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/9D33C1B8-6087-4E94-AD90-7A8A03443823.htm (last visited Au-
gust 5, 2010). 
 6. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 79(1) (“A Trust Fund shall be established by 
decision of the Assembly of States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such victims.”). 
 7. TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, GLOBAL STRATEGIC PLAN 2009–2012 (2008) (unpub-
lished draft, version 1) (on file with author). 
 8. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Int’l Criminal Court, R. 98, Sept. 9, 2002, ICC-
ASP/1/3 [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence], available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rules+of+Procedure+and+
Evidence.htm. 
 9. Regulations of the Trust Fund for Victims para. 21(a), Dec. 3, 2005, ICC-
ASP/4/Res.3, available at http://www.icc-
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directed reparation orders and which may be awarded at the Fund’s dis-
cretion. 
This Article seeks to characterize the operation of the TFV in relation 
to victims when it comes to these autonomous resources emanating from 
the “international community.” Are they a form of charity? Or, do they 
represent an entitlement on the part of victims? On what grounds should 
victims be compensated internationally in addition to what the convicted 
may be able to pay? These issues are typically not treated in the literature 
on the ICC even though they raise very profound questions about the 
nature of international criminal justice. Studies of the Fund thus far seem 
driven by attention to details and a rush to answer concrete questions 
about operations (e.g., who should it compensate and by how much) ra-
ther than paying attention to the development of a solid theory of the 
TFV’s compensation regime.10 This arguably creates a risk of confusion, 
a confusion that may ultimately be paid by the frustration of victims, and 
various assorted problems for international criminal justice. 
In practice, the TFV is promoted through a mixture of pragmatism and 
appeal to emotions.11 On the one hand, the TFV adopts the language of 
project management and good governance.12 On the other hand, such is 
the power of appeals to “victims” in international criminal justice that the 
Fund may be tempted to simply invoke the fundamental moral legitimacy 
of its work to defer theoretical inquiry.13 Talk of victims by TFV authori-
                                                                                                             
cpi.int/menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/regulations%20of%
20the%20trust%20fund%20for%20victims [hereinafter TFV Regulations]. 
 10. For example, the website of the TFV cautiously outlines its immediate legal basis 
but little else. See Legal Basis, TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/legal-basis (last visited Sept. 21, 2010). 
 11. The logic of emotions as one of the natural orientations of international criminal 
justice is highlighted in Leslie Vinjamuri & Jack Snyder, Advocacy and Scholarship in 
the Study of International War Crime Tribunals and Transitional Justice (2004). 
 12. See, e.g., The Two Roles of the TFV, TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS, 
http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/two-roles-tfv (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) ( “TFV is 
learning valuable lessons about the unique role that a legal institution can play in address-
ing the needs of victims of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Through 
regular monitoring and evaluation and targeted research, the TFV is documenting and 
sharing these lessons to inform its work.”). 
 13. This has long been apparent in domestic discussions on compensation schemes. 
For example, in parliamentary debates preceding the adoption of the British scheme, Lord 
Shawcross rejected the need for “‘an elaborate theoretical or philosophical speculation as 
to why the State should intervene in a matter of this kind’” and recommended that one 
merely rely on “‘public instinct.’” P.S. ATIYAH & PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, 
COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 255 (5th ed. 1993). 
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ties is rife with emotion, in ways that seem to sidestep the need for fun-
damental justification.14 
In between managerial pragmatism and emotional empathy with vic-
tims, nonetheless, real questions arise that are not currently being ad-
dressed. For example, how different is the TFV from a variety of interna-
tional institutions and NGOs involved in the transitional justice efforts 
and support to victims on the ground? To what extent should the Fund’s 
embeddedness in the apparatus of international criminal justice make it a 
specific institution whose mandate is like no others’? Why should vic-
tims of only certain international crimes benefit from the fund, or victims 
of crimes as opposed to a range of other catastrophic life events (say, 
natural catastrophes)? How and to what extent should victims be helped? 
These questions hold tremendous significance in an international system 
where millions suffer daily of various maladies from crass poverty to 
preventable diseases, and where it is unclear why victims of international 
crimes should “jump queue” (not to mention victims of certain interna-
tional crimes rather than others). Neither pragmatist nor emotional ap-
peals provide us with an understandable account of the construction of a 
“legitimate victim” and his/her relation to the international community. 
This Article proposes to explore different, although not necessarily ex-
clusive, rationales for the TFV’s work in an attempt to build one of the 
first theoretical frameworks of its work. Scattered emerging research on 
the TFV has explored two types of analogies.15 One has been collective 
claims processes,16 typically those related to the commission of mass 
crimes, such as Holocaust-related litigation. This is an interesting analo-
gy but Holocaust claims were largely disconnected from the operation of 
                                                                                                             
 14. See, e.g., Ambassador Altangerel, Trust Fund for Victims, Address at the Assem-
bly of States Parties (Nov. 2009) (transcript available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/Statements/ICC-ASP-ASP8-statements-TFV-ENG.pdf). 
 15. See generally REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES 
AGAINST HUMANITY: SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING (Carla Ferstman, 
Mariana Goetz & Alan Stephens eds., 2009) (analyzing the implementation of reparations 
for victims through an examination of Holocaust and other mass claims in international 
and regional courts, as well as reparations schemes at the national level). 
 16. See generally DINAH L. SHELTON & THORDIS INGADOTTIR, CTR. ON INT’L 
COOPERATION, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT REPARATIONS TO VICTIMS OF 
CRIMES (ARTICLE 75 OF THE ROME STATUTE) AND THE TRUST FUND (ARTICLE 79): 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COURT RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 
(1999), available at http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/PICT_articles/REPARATIONS.PDF (analyzing the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the reparations model and the structure of the TFV). 
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international or domestic criminal justice.17 The alternative route is to 
look at existing domestic and international trust funds occasionally 
created to deal with episodes of mass criminality or particularly horrend-
ous crimes.18 This can help capture the fact that compensation of the sort 
envisaged by the TFV is fundamentally donor driven and public in cha-
racter, rather than a response to private litigation. However, unlike the 
TFV, these trust funds also operate largely outside the framework of 
criminal justice, and are themselves in need of better theoretical justifica-
tion.19 
If one lets go of the intuition that the answer is to be found in the con-
text of mass criminality and transitional justice, the better analogy is that 
the TFV takes its cue from what is in fact an already remarkable histo-
ry—the development of domestic victim compensation schemes de-
signed to deal with ordinary, particularly violent crimes. These schemes 
have existed for about half a century and are now a permanent feature of 
many justice systems.20 Furthermore, where the creation of the potential-
ly far more ambitious TFV seems to give rise only to a muted and 
theory-deficient dialogue between NGOs, government, and international 
technocrats, the justifications proffered for domestic victim compensa-
tion schemes have often sparked passionate theoretical, jurisprudential, 
                                                                                                             
 17. For example, litigation against Swiss banks was unconnected (at least directly) to 
the operation of the process of prosecuting Nazis for crimes after the Second World War. 
See Lawrence Collins, Reflections on Holocaust Claims in International Law, 41 ISR. L. 
REV. 402, 404–408 (2008). In fact, most “Holocaust litigation” has been directed at states 
and corporations in ways that were largely dissociated from the criminal law. See gener-
ally id. 
 18. See, e.g., Peter G. Fischer, The Victims’ Trust Fund of the International Criminal 
Court—Formation of a Functional Reparations Scheme, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187 
(2003) (arguing that the VTF should look to international human rights tribunals and 
domestic compensation schemes such as the September 11th Fund as models); Tom Dan-
nenbaum, The International Criminal Court, Article 79, and Transitional Justice: The 
Case for an Independent Trust Fund for Victims, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 234 (2010). 
 19. For example, it is often unclear whether they operate on the basis of recognition 
of responsibility or as charitable schemes—some of the same problems raised, as we will 
see, by the TFV’s existence. 
 20. See Maxine D. Kersh, The Empowerment of the Crime Victim: A Comparative 
Study of Victim Compensation Schemes in the United States and Australia, 24 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 345, 345 (1994); Desmond S. Greer, A Transatlantic Perspective on the Com-
pensation of Crime Victims in the United States, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 333 
(1994); Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. 
REV. 167, 181–83 (2004); ROBERT ELIAS, VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM: CRIME VICTIMS AND 
COMPENSATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26 (1983) [hereinafter 
ELIAS, VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM]. 
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and political debates.21 In particular, the emergence of compensation 
schemes raises fundamental questions about the relationship of crime to 
community and the very nature of community.22 These questions take on 
an even greater degree of relevance internationally, where notions of 
community are inherently problematic and where the emergence of a 
compensatory logic may be profoundly transformative and contentious.23 
The hypothesis, therefore, is that international criminal justice can 
draw inspiration from some of these domestic ideas. The challenge is to 
discern the extent to which domestic rationales for victim compensation 
can be transposed to the international sphere. This will, by necessity, be 
an exercise in reflection both on criminal justice and international law, a 
particular institution (the TFV) and others like it, and, ultimately, the 
nature of obligations to victims in any system. It requires one to draw on 
interdisciplinary tools at the intersection of criminal law, international 
law, criminology, victimology, jurisprudence, political theory, history, 
and international relations. Needless to say, the questions envisaged here 
are not only of considerable theoretical tenor, they also have a very con-
crete dimension. The theory on which any system bases compensation of 
victims will determine, in turn, what form that compensation should take, 
who should be responsible for it, and for what amount. For the TFV to 
develop, such a theory will be crucial to its success and its ability, among 
others, to convince donors to fund it generously. 
The Article begins by briefly presenting the basic analogy between 
domestic compensation schemes and the ICC compensation regime, par-
ticularly as represented by the TFV (I). On the basis of long-running dis-
cussions on the proper rationale of domestic compensation schemes, it 
will then seek to highlight some of the better justifications for the nature 
of victim compensation by the TFV (II). 
                                                                                                             
 21. See, e.g., DANIEL MCGILLIS & PATRICIA SMITH, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN PROGRAMS, at v (1983) 
(noting that “considerable national attention” and “extensive congressional debate and 
investigation” engendered by the development of crime victim compensation programs in 
the United States made the study necessary). 
 22. See Andrew Ashworth, Punishment and Compensation: Victims, Offenders and 
the State, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 86, 91–99 (1986). 
 23. See generally Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The ‘International Communi-
ty’: Facing the Challenge of Globalization, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 266 (1998) (examining the 
concept of “international community” and associated challenges among various schools 
of thought). 
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I. THE ICC AND DOMESTIC VICTIM COMPENSATION SCHEMES: BASIC 
ANALOGY AND ISSUES 
A. The Emergence and Record of Domestic Victim Compensation 
Schemes 
Although this has been little commented upon in the context of the 
ICC/TFV, the idea of domestic victim compensation schemes is in fact 
an ancient one.24 Some of its oldest antecedents include a mention in the 
Hammurabi code that if a person was robbed and the robber escaped, the 
victim could expect the city where the robbery occurred to compensate 
him.25 Grand Duke Leopold of Tuscany set up one of the earliest 
schemes in 1786. In the modern era, the idea of victim compensation 
schemes was rediscovered by utilitarians, keen on maximizing the utility 
of the criminal justice system. These utilitarians cautioned against a tra-
ditionally excessively retributivist focus in criminal justice and were na-
turally inclined to think that correcting the harm done to both society and 
victims should be a part of the process. Bentham, as a representative of 
that current, took up the idea in Principles of Penal Law by suggesting 
that “if the delinquent have no fortune,” satisfaction “ought to be made at 
the expense of the public treasure, because it is an object of public bene-
fit; the security of all is concerned.”26 Italian 19th century criminologists 
endorsed the concept enthusiastically,27 and the issue was discussed in 
several international penological congresses.28 
Compensation schemes can be described as schemes involved in “[t]he 
granting of public funds to persons who have been victimized by a crime 
of violence and to persons who survive those killed by such crimes.”29 
                                                                                                             
 24. For a recent synthesis of that history, see Michael O’Connell, Criminal Injuries 
Compensation: Revisiting the Rationale for State Funded Compensation for Crime Vic-
tims 2–7 (unpublished paper presented at the Innovation: Promising Practices for Victims 
and Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System national conference in Canberra on June 
23–24, 2003) (available at http://www.victimsupport.act.gov.au/res/File/O’Connell.pdf). 
 25. Robert D. Childres, Compensation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 444, 444 (1964). 
 26. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 365, 386 (Russell & Russell Inc. 1962) (1843), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=
2009&Itemid=99999999. 
 27. See ENRICO FERRI, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY 110 (Kessinger Publishing 2004) 
(1884). 
 28. International Prison Conference, Paris, 1885; General Assembly of the Interna-
tional Criminalistic Society, 1890. 
 29. HERBERT EDELHERTZ & GILBERT GEIS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION TO VICTIMS OF 
CRIME 3 (1974). 
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The important thing is that the funds are public; in other words, they 
come from a source external to the crime and are awarded on the basis of 
a particular account of the needs of victims or of the interest of the public 
good.30 Their emergence ranks as one of the most significant criminolog-
ical developments in the Western world and beyond of the last four dec-
ades.31 The inspiration for the first experiments came from the UK, more 
specifically from a famous article first published in 1957 in the Observer 
by Margaret Fry, a member of the Howard League of Penal Reform.32 
New Zealand enacted the very first comprehensive compensation 
scheme, which took effect in 1964.33 Almost simultaneously, similar 
schemes emerged in the UK34 (today, the world’s largest) and Califor-
nia,35 soon followed by New York.36 Today, all US states have one,37 
and there is even a scheme at the federal level.38 In Canada, victim com-
pensation prevails at the provincial level, such as the Province of 
Québec’s Loi sur l’indemnisation des victims d’actes criminels and the 
                                                                                                             
 30. For an early overview of such programs, see generally id. 
 31. See LORRAINE WOLHUTER, NEIL OLLEY & DAVID DENHAM, VICTOMOLOGY: 
VICTIMISATION AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 1 (2009). 
 32. Margery Fry, Justice for Victims, 8 J. PUB. L.191 (1959), originally published in 
THE OBSERVER (London), July 7, 1957, at 8. 
 33. B.J. Cameron, Compensation for Victims of Crime: the New Zealand Experiment, 
12 J. PUB. L. 367, 367–68 (1963) (Parliament enacted the Criminal Injuries Compensa-
tion Act “on 24 October 1963, to become effective on 1 January 1964.”); Kent M. 
Weeks, The New Zealand Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 
107, 107–108 (1970). 
 34. See Joanna Shapland, Victims, the Criminal Justice System and Compensation, 24 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 131, 137–40 (1984) (discussing the justifications and parameters 
of the British compensation scheme). 
 35. Willard Shank, Aid to Victims of Violent Crimes in California, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 
85, 85 (1970); James E. Culhane, California Enacts Legislation to Aid Victims of Crimi-
nal Violence, 18 STAN. L. REV. 266, 266 (1965); Gilbert Geis & Herbert Edelhertz, Cali-
fornia’s New Crime Victim Compensation Statute, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 880, 880 
(1974). 
 36. Michael J. Novack, Crime Victim Compensation: The New York Solution, 35 
ALB. L. REV. 717, 724 (1971). 
 37. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, DONALD R. CRESSEY & DAVID F. LUCKENBILL, 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 299 (11th ed. 1992). For a full list and links to specific in-
formation about each state’s program, see State Links, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIME 
VICTIM COMPENSATION BOARDS, http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?sid=6 (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2010). 
 38. This was advocated early on. See MONIKA B. REED, TENN. CORR. INST. & NAT’L 
INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COMPENSATION AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1980) (“advo-
cat[ing] national victim compensation legislation using the legislation established in the 
state of Tennessee as a guide”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 10601 (2006) (establishing a Crime 
Victims Fund). 
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Victims’ Justice Fund in Ontario.39 Sweden adopted a state compensa-
tion program, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, in 1978.40 Funds 
have also been created in France,41 Germany,42 Italy,43 and numerous 
other European countries.44 Indeed, the issue became a pan-European 
one with the adoption, first, of the Convention on the Compensation of 
Victims of Violent Crime in 1983 by the Council of Europe and, subse-
quently, of a European Union Council Directive of 2004.45 The directive 
contemplates that “[a]ll Member States shall ensure that their national 
rules provide for the existence of a scheme on compensation to victims 
of violent intentional crimes committed in their respective territories.”46 
A majority of Council of Europe states now implement this obligation.47 
Some compensation funds now even have an extra-territorial reach, cov-
ering citizens who have suffered harm abroad, particularly as a result of 
terrorist attacks.48 
The United Nations also takes a strong stance in favor of victim com-
pensation schemes. The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power anticipates that “[w]hen compen-
sation is not fully available from the offender or other sources, States 
                                                                                                             
 39. An Overview of Victim Services Across Canada, FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN FOR 
VICTIMS OF CRIME, http://www.victimsfirst.gc.ca/serv/ov-ap.html (follow hyperlinks for 
“Ontario” and “Quebec”) (last modified Feb. 26, 2009). 
 40. Council of Europe, Hans-Joerg Albrecht & Michael Kilchling, Victims of Terror-
ism—Policies and Legislation in Europe: an Overview on Victim-Related Assistance and 
Support, in VICTIMS—SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE 240 (Sept. 2006), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/victims/6041-6-ID3996-Victims%20-
%20Support%20and%20assistance.pdf. 
 41. Id. at 218. 
 42. Id. at 220. 
 43. Id. at 224. 
 44. See id. at 211–45 (discussing regulations relating to victims in the member states 
of the Council of Europe). 
 45. Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime art. 2, Nov. 24, 
1983, 24 XI.1983, E.T.S. 116 [hereinafter European Convention on the Compensation of 
Victims of Violent Crimes], available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=116&CM=1&DF=0
3/09/2010&CL=ENG; Council Directive 04/80, art. 2, 2004 O.J. (L 261) 15, 16 (EC) 
[hereinafter Council Directive]. 
 46. Council Directive, supra note 45, art. 12, para. 2. 
 47. Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, at 4, COM (2009) 170 final (April 20, 2009). 
 48. E.g., Ann Riley, UK Introduces Compensation Scheme for Victims of Overseas 
Terrorist Attacks, JURIST (Jan. 19, 2010, 11:29 AM), 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2010/01/uk-introduces-compensation-scheme-
for.php. 
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should endeavour to provide financial compensation.”49 Indeed, the UN 
established some of its own victim compensation funds. The first was the 
UN Trust Fund for Chile, a voluntary fund “to receive contributions and 
distribute . . . humanitarian, legal and financial aid to persons whose hu-
man rights have been violated by detention or imprisonment in Chile.”50 
This transformed into the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, 
which is still active today and distributes funds to non-governmental or-
ganizations providing humanitarian assistance to victims of torture and 
their family members.51 The UN also maintains a Voluntary Trust Fund 
on Contemporary Forms of Slavery established by the General Assembly 
in 199152 to, inter alia, “extend, through established channels of assis-
tance, humanitarian, legal and financial aid to individuals whose human 
rights have been severely violated as a result of contemporary forms of 
slavery.”53 
Typically, funds emerged to compensate grave violent crimes, specific 
categories of crime, or even specific incidents. In the US, for example, 
special funds have been created to compensate victims of notorious “ter-
rorist” acts such as the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979,54 the Oklahoma City 
bombing,55 and most recently, the attacks of September 11, 2001.56 The 
                                                                                                             
 49. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, Annex ¶ 12, U.N. Doc..A/Res/40/34/ (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinaf-
ter UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power]. 
 50. Establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund for Chile, G.A. Res. 33/174, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/174 (Dec. 20, 1978). 
 51. United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, G.A. Res 36/151, ¶ 1(a), 
U.N. Doc A/RES/36/151 (Dec. 16, 1981) [hereinafter United Nations Voluntary Fund for 
Victims of Torture]. 
 52. United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, G.A. 
Res. 46/122, U,N. Doc. A/RES/46/122 (Dec. 17, 1991). 
 53. United Nations Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, United Nations 
Voluntary Trust Fund on Contemporary Forms of Slavery Guidelines for the Use of Or-
ganizations, ¶ 1, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Slavery/GuidelinesFund.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 3, 2010); see also United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund on Contempo-
rary Forms of Slavery, supra note 52, art. 1(b). 
 54. Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 99–399, §§ 801–808, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat. 853) 1926, 1954 (1986) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 5569 
(2003)). 
 55. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for 
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy that Oc-
curred at Oklahoma City, and Rescissions Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–19, 109 Stat. 194 
(1995). 
 56. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107–42, §§ 
401–409, 115 Stat. 230, 237 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101) (establishing the 
“September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001”) [hereinafter A.T.S.S.S.A.]. The 
134 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
trend is towards general terrorism compensation funds, dissociated from 
any particular incident. For example, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act57 in the US allows for compensation of both interna-
tional and domestic terrorism. The French Guarantee Fund has a special 
compensatory regime for victims of terrorist attacks.58 Moreover, some 
schemes have begun to appear that grant compensation for all serious 
violent offenses. The UK Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme, for 
example, provides compensation to victims of violent crime, such as 
physical assault or sexual offenses.59 
Although victim compensation schemes have occasionally been criti-
cized for inadequately compensating some victims or attending to too 
small a portion of their needs,60 there is also no doubt that they are well 
established, robust means of dealing with compensation, that distribute 
millions in compensation every year.61 In a sense, victim compensation 
schemes offer the best of both worlds in that they isolate the criminal 
process from the treatment of victims (thus ensuring that the interests of 
the victims do not compromise the fairness of the trial), but still allow for 
significant compensation. Indeed, the emergence of victim compensation 
schemes has considerable implications for the conceptualization of 
crime, criminal repression, and victimhood. They nudge criminal justice 
in a more restorative direction (where the satisfaction of the victim is 
                                                                                                             
A.T.S.S.S.A. indicates that the purpose of this Fund is “to provide compensation to any 
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also LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES FROM THE 
9/11 ATTACKS 21 (2004). 
 57. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 58. Loi 90–589 du 6 juillet 1990 modifiant le code de procédure pénale et le code des 
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Victims of Acts of Terrorism and Other Offences). 
 59. CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION AUTHORITY, THE CRIMINAL INJURIES 
COMPENSATION SCHEME (2008), ¶ 9 (2008), 
http://www.cica.gov.uk/Documents/publications/Criminal%20Injuries%20Compensation
%20Scheme%202008.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (U.K.). 
 60. Duncan Chappell, Providing for the Victim of Crime: Political Placebos or Pro-
gressive Programs?, 4 ADEL. L. REV. 294, 303 (1972). 
 61. See William E. Hoelzel, A Survey of 27 Victim Compensation Programs, 63 
JUDICATURE 485, 486, 488 (1980). 
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seen as key),62 and they “socialize” the cost of crime where traditionally 
states were quite willing to simply pocket fines.63 
As with the TFV, one of the crucial tensions that nonetheless characte-
rizes victim compensation schemes is between ideas of reparation, com-
pensation, and assistance. Reparations are primarily owed by a legal sub-
ject found liable for harm caused. They are awarded on the basis of that 
harm, as a matter of right, and ideally, aim to put the victim in the situa-
tion in which she was before the crime was committed. Their amount is 
based on the gravity of the harm suffered, and they are typically 
awarded, once and for all, following a judicial decision. Although they 
can be part of orders made after a criminal verdict or even a sentencing, 
their fundamental logic is inspired by the law of torts.64 Compensation is 
often used to refer to a form of public complement or substitute to repa-
rations. Authorities provide funds as a sort of “back up” solution when-
ever the guilty party is unable to pay the full amount ordered. The State 
(or society in general) therefore, act as “guarantors” of the right to repa-
ration, and the amount offered in compensation is, in theory, the same as 
the amount of the original reparation order. Sometimes, as in the case of 
the ICC, victim compensation schemes act in close coordination with the 
justice system by implementing its decisions.65 At times though, com-
pensation will become entirely dissociated from the criminal trial and 
reparations that might hypothetically be paid by the accused.66 In such 
cases, “there is a ‘victim of crime’ without the elements of a crime hav-
ing been established by a criminal court.”67 In some cases, the funds may 
try to recoup the money from the accused or have at least part of it 
funded by fines or through a tax levied on prisoners,68 but this is not al-
ways the case. Providing compensation separate from a criminal trial 
                                                                                                             
 62. HEATHER STRANG, REPAIR OR REVENGE: VICTIMS AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 17 
(2002). 
 63. See SUSAN KISS SARNOFF, PAYING FOR CRIME: THE POLICIES AND POSSIBILITIES OF 
CRIME VICTIM REIMBURSEMENT 69, 80 (1996). 
 64. See Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the 
Role of the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 52, 52–56 (1982). 
 65. See, e.g., Regina v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte Lain, (1967) 
2 Q.B. 864 at 876 (Eng.) (describing the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board of the 
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 66. DEBORAH M. CARROW, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME 
VICTIM COMPENSATION 2 (1980); see also Chappell, supra note 60, at 299 (arguing 
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et al. eds., 1986). 
 68. Hoelzel, supra note 61, at 492–93. 
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signals a move away from strict reparatory logic and manifests a more 
general departure from fault that is evident in other areas, such as prod-
uct liability or work safety, where old tortious remedies sometimes seem 
unsuited to the problem.69 More specifically, this shift coincides with the 
distancing of victim compensation schemes from the judicial system, so 
that victims become victims of “crime” rather than any one particular 
“criminal.” Thus, at least theoretically, compensation could function in 
ways entirely unrelated to criminal justice or tortious liability. 
Moving even further from the logic of reparations, some victim com-
pensation schemes do not offer compensation strict sensu as much as 
“assistance” (although it is still sometimes confusingly referred to as 
compensation). Typically, “assistance” is designed to help victims cope 
with the consequences of crime, but not with a view to actually compen-
sate them for the occurrence of the crime. Assistance is provided to vic-
tims on the basis of their current needs, independently of an evaluation of 
the actual prejudice they may have suffered as a result of the crime. It is 
in essence palliative and can be awarded entirely independent of a judi-
cial decision. Assistance schemes are aimed at mitigating the experience 
of victimhood, rather than repairing the consequences of crime. As has 
been emphasized: 
[T]he moral, psychological and financial support that can be provided 
through the health and social services, and in particular through Victim 
Support, offers genuine resources, at relatively little cost, for healing 
the trauma caused by violent crime, and there is a strong case for say-
ing that generous provision of these services for victims is a better use 
of public money than a system of monetary compensation that will sel-
dom have any real equivalence with the hurt actually suffered.70 
The general feeling in such cases is that payment is not made as a re-
sult of the recognition of any strict legal obligation or responsibility. 
Typical assistance measures include medical assistance, psychological 
counseling, payment of lawyers’ fees, rehabilitation, etc. This assistance 
trend is also evident internationally. The UN Torture Fund, for example, 
which from its inception moved away from financial compensation for 
victims of torture, prefers to fund NGOs that provide direct “psychologi-
                                                                                                             
 69. John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation, and Two Kinds of Justice, 55 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1027, 1085 (2003). 
 70. John Haldane & Anthony Harvey, The Philosophy of State Compensation, 12 J. 
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cal, medical, social, legal . . . economic,” humanitarian, or other forms of 
assistance “to victims of torture and their families.”71 
To make matters more complicated, closely tracking the distinction be-
tween reparation and assistance is the tension between funds that are 
conceived as based on a right to compensation and those whose opera-
tion is more discretionary. Reparation is typically considered a right (al-
though not necessarily always a right that the state is supposed to guaran-
tee), whilst assistance is typically seen as discretionary. However, it is 
not impossible to conceive of a “right to assistance” and, possibly, only a 
loose “claim” to reparation. This tension between reparation oriented 
models of victim compensation and assistance oriented ones, on the one 
hand, and rights and discretion based models, on the other, is crucial in 
shaping victim compensation schemes. It is particularly alive in the case 
of the ICC because all of these logics, potentially, coexist: the ICC can 
order reparations, the TFV can use some of its own resources to “guaran-
tee” compensation as a substitute to convicted reparations, and it can en-
gage in “assistance” that is not strictly compensatory. Which model a 
compensation scheme evolves towards, in turn, is dependent on its ratio-
nale. Of the many potential rationales for compensation funds, not all are 
likely to be equally useful in assessing potential scenarios for the TFV. 
B. The Rome Statute’s Victims Compensation Regime: A Brief Overview 
The ad hoc tribunals historically did little for victims of international 
crimes. At best, victims who also happened to be witnesses (a very small 
minority) were eligible for some degree of protection and assistance be-
fore, during, and to a lesser extent, after their testimony. The Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals did not have an institutionalized witness and victims 
protection regime, although this situation was improved in the 1990’s 
with the setting up of specialized units at the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”).72 For the most part, however, interna-
tional criminal justice has long been considered by its leading practition-
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ers to be, fundamentally, about the accused. This focus was justified ei-
ther on retributivist grounds, invoking the importance of punishment 
over all else, or on liberal grounds, foregrounding the importance of li-
berties and, in particular, the presumption of innocence and assorted 
guarantees.73 The assistance that victims qua witnesses received was in 
no way directly connected to the harm they had suffered, nor did it have 
any reparatory ambition, except perhaps in terms of compensating for the 
trouble occasioned by the testimony itself. To put it crudely, it served to 
ensure that victims were fit physically and psychologically to withstand 
courtroom pressures or, at worst, to entice skeptical victims to testify. 
The weak and anecdotal reparations regimes of the ad hoc tribunals were 
hardly ever used,74 and “internationalized courts” fared little better.75 
The limits of a model interested only in victims for instrumental rea-
sons began to appear in the 1990’s. Victim witnesses were confused 
when much needed material or psychological assistance was discontin-
ued after they testified. More generally, victims’ associations in the For-
mer Yugoslavia and, especially, in Rwanda clamored for the integration 
of a compensatory element in international criminal justice. At about the 
same time, as the excitement surrounding their creation had settled down, 
international criminal tribunals began to enter a crisis of legitimacy, 
which made a novel focus on victims an attractive possibility. The ICTR 
sought to make moves in this direction, for example, by giving limited 
assistance to some victim-oriented NGOs. 76 However, with very limited 
funding, fear by donors of “mission-creep,” and no real legal mandate, 
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such efforts never truly flourished and, if anything, actually made things 
worse by creating a few privileged victims at the expense of the great 
mass of others. 
The stage was set for a major change of attitude vis-à-vis victims at the 
Rome Conference in 1998,77 which manifested itself spectacularly in two 
respects. First, the Rome Statute proclaims, for the first time in the histo-
ry of international criminal justice, a principle of victim participation 
“[w]here the personal interests of the victims are affected.”78 At every 
stage where their interests are implicated, victims are considered as par-
ticipants, although not quite parties.79 Second, and most importantly for 
our purposes, the Rome Statute marks the emergence for the first time in 
the history of international criminal justice of the ambitious regime of 
victim compensation that is the subject of this Article. 
The ICC/TFV regime is quite unique in that it manages to combine all 
the different elements that exist in domestic victim compensation 
schemes. First, the regime has a strong reparations component, which 
flows from its fundamental judicial nature. Reparations can be awarded 
by the ICC where a person prosecuted by the Court has been found 
guilty.80 Reparations are funded in large part through fines, forfeitures, 
and reparations ordered by the Court against convicted individuals.81 
Contrary to the regime of the ad hoc tribunals, reparations are not out-
sourced to domestic courts but are very much centralized within the 
hands of the Court itself.82 Although reparations raise all kinds of com-
plex issues in and of themselves,83 there is little doubt about their funda-
mental nature in the context of the ICC: they are ordered against the ac-
cused and for the benefit of his/her victims with a view to compensating 
the harm caused. 
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The regime is complicated by the fact that the Court, in its reparation-
awarding function, can be seconded by the TFV.84 In that particular role, 
the TFV acts as the implementer of select reparations awards ordered by 
the Court.85 It is required to take a variety of factors into account when 
“determining the nature and/or size of awards,” such as “the nature of the 
crimes [and] the particular injuries to the victims.”86 The Board of Direc-
tors of the TFV must devise an “implementation plan” supervised by the 
relevant Chamber, even though the Board clearly retains a measure of 
autonomy.87 One stated rationale for this situation is that it would be im-
practical for the Court to take care of every detail of every reparations 
award, and that the TFV may be especially more suited to making collec-
tive awards. In that capacity, the TFV will very much be working under a 
strict reparations logic, under close judicial scrutiny. This regime would 
not in itself be exceptional88 if it were not complemented by a further 
dimension of the TFV. In addition to receiving funds to implement repa-
ration awards on the Court’s behalf, the TFV receives voluntary contri-
butions from governments, intergovernmental organizations, and non-
governmental organizations.89 From the outset, it has been quite unclear 
as a matter of policy whether these funds can and, most importantly, 
should be set aside to fill-in for the lack of resources of the accused90 or 
whether they should be used for an entirely different purpose. 
In a relatively surprising decision allowing the TFV to proceed with 
some of its assistance initiatives, an ICC pre-trial chamber held that “the 
responsibility of the Trust Fund is first and foremost to ensure that suffi-
cient funds are available in the eventuality of a Court reparation order 
pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute.”91 This decision, which has been 
soundly criticized,92 seems in tension with the TFV’s own understanding 
of its role93 and may be challenged in the future. Relegating the TFV to 
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that singular purpose pushes it in the direction of an orthodox compensa-
tion scheme, guaranteeing reparations rather than engaging in a program 
to more broadly assist crime victims. The TFV, up until now, set aside 
about a quarter of its budget for the purposes of future reparations.94 
However, it remains to be seen to what extent it is preemptively obliged 
to set aside money for reparations. The scenario raises many questions: 
what happens if it does not have enough funds? Should it always priorit-
ize this function as opposed to any other possible uses of its funds? 
As it happens, the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide for an 
alternative destination for the TFV’s own resources. These can “be used 
for the benefit of victims,”95 in particular whenever the Board of Direc-
tors of the TFV “considers it necessary to provide physical or psycholog-
ical rehabilitation or material support for the benefit of victims and their 
families.”96 Already, the TFV has been remarkably active and successful 
in spending funds towards assistance programs, sponsoring thirty four 
projects, and reaching more than 200,000 victims and family members in 
northern Uganda and the DRC.97 These include a veritable hodgepodge 
of activities: community support, micro-credit, vocational training, coun-
seling, social events, workshops, medical and orthopedic support, recon-
structive surgery, reintegration, peace and reconciliation, shelters, etc. 
Money spent as assistance to victims follows a regime quite distinct 
from reparations. TFV funded programs on behalf of victims may be dis-
bursed before a verdict has been rendered or regardless of whether any-
one is even prosecuted. Additionally, all victims of crimes falling within 
the jurisdiction of the Court, rather than only victims of crimes commit-
ted by individuals who have been found guilty, are eligible for assis-
tance.98 This is something that the TFV has already done by financing 
projects in Uganda and the DRC, even as prosecutions were pending (in-
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deed, in the case of Uganda, before anyone was even arrested).99 The 
requirement that the TFV ask the Court’s permission to launch an assis-
tance program100 does not change the fundamental character of what is at 
stake, nor is it an attempt by the court to fundamentally control when and 
where assistance money is spent; it merely reflects a concern with the 
risk that awarding assistance might affect the rights of the accused. 
In other words, whilst the role of the Court in relation to reparations is 
quite clear, the role of the TFV is much more complex, at least when its 
hands are not bound by a Court order. The TFV’s ability to control funds 
of its own, in particular, gives it a unique potential to shape the overall 
ICC victim compensation regime. There is no doubt that the two models 
it could espouse are in tension—one is based on reparations and the other 
on assistance; one is backward-looking and guilt-oriented, the other more 
forward-looking and need-oriented. Specifically, their coexistence raises 
issues about what a proper theoretical justification for this dual system 
would look like and especially how one might best account for the at-
tempt to “share” the costs of crime between the accused and society at 
large. 
These problems are quite clearly reminiscent of earlier debates on the 
proper role of domestic victim compensation schemes. The challenge, of 
course, is that these debates, although clearly illuminating, were never 
conclusive domestically, and their transposition to the international plane 
creates an additional hurdle. The danger, if one is not careful, is to reason 
on the basis of a misleading “domestic analogy.” At the very least, the 
ICC and the TFV operate in an environment that is fundamentally differ-
ent from that of domestic society, even as they may be part of an effort to 
emulate some of its features.101 The international system is traditionally 
one without sovereign that is arguably a society only in a loose sense, 
marked by a high degree of decentralization. The more ambitious forms 
of compensation schemes, by contrast, have often taken hold at the inter-
section of the late development of criminal justice and social welfare in 
advanced industrialized societies, exhibiting relatively high levels of so-
cial solidarity. The challenge, therefore, is to understand how the two—a 
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still largely decentralized system of states, on the one hand, and the insti-
tutional by product of highly solidaristic systems—can be paired togeth-
er. The answer, as will become clear, may well be that the international 
system is in fact changing considerably, or at least that the ambition of a 
strong victim compensation regime before the ICC presumes that it has 
or will. 
II. IN SEARCH OF A RATIONALE: WHAT IS THE TFV’S FUNDAMENTAL 
JUSTIFICATION? 
The form a victim compensation scheme takes will often hinge on how 
it has been conceived and its fundamental purpose. But, apart from the 
fact that victims may be pleased to receive compensation, there is noth-
ing obvious about the existence of such schemes. As one author put it, 
“since individuals are expected to bear the consequences of many kinds 
of misfortune,” proponents of compensation schemes need to adduce a 
proper rationale as to why victims of crime—indeed, of particular 
crimes—should see their harm partly absorbed by the collectivity.102 The 
same is arguably even truer at the international level, where it has long 
been evident that individuals suffer all kinds of misfortunes without so 
much as a minimal expectation that the international community should 
shoulder the cost of harm incurred. This makes it even more crucial to 
articulate a proper rationale for the existence of an international victim 
compensation scheme, and in particular, the TFV. This Part will explore 
a series of possible rationales for the role of the TFV taken from domes-
tic experience, each in its own way problematic. These accounts are (A) 
criminal, (B) political, (C) consequentialist, (D) practical, (E) legal, (F) 
political theoretical, (G) charitable/humanitarian, (H) moral and equita-
ble, or (I) welfare/solidarist. In the conclusion, the article suggests ways 
in which an overall account of the justification of victim compensation in 
the international context might one day be produced that draws on some 
of the above. 
A. Criminal Justice Rationale: The TFV as a Corrective to the Limita-
tions of Retributive Justice 
The emergence of victim compensation schemes is often, first and 
foremost, conceptualized as a development endogenous to criminal jus-
tice, and the evolution of the place and role of the victim within the lat-
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ter.103 As is well known, modernity gradually excluded the victim not 
only from the criminal process itself, but from any prospect for repara-
tion as a result of the criminal trial.104 This is in contrast to the position in 
pre-modern days, where punishment and reparations had been confused 
and criminal justice and torts were little distinguished. In other words, 
harm was effectively conceived as committed primarily against the vic-
tim as opposed to “society” or “the state;” the role of the state consisted, 
at best, of mediating between the parties in an effort to avoid “blood 
feuds.” In ancient Romano-Germanic law, the “composition” (i.e. com-
pensation) was typically paid either as “bot” to a victim who sustained 
injuries or as “wergild” (literally, a man’s value) to the family of a de-
ceased victim.105 Punishment was only subsidiary, mandated in cases 
where the guilty could not afford to pay.106 This was consonant with a 
view of criminal justice as essentially a form of private justice in which 
even the apprehension of criminals was often left to the victims.107 
With heightened state centralization and the idea that the criminal law 
could serve to protect the public order, fines (as they became known) 
began to be paid to the state rather than victims.108 Victims might, of 
course, turn to civil remedies, but these were often neatly excluded from 
the criminal trial (except in European continental systems with a tradition 
of parties civiles, which allows victims to “piggyback” on the state’s 
prosecution as parties).109 Criminal justice became a branch of public 
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. . . approach[es] the situation of parties civiles in civil law systems.”). 
2010] JUSTIFYING COMPENSATION BY THE ICC 145 
law, one devoted to the protection of a certain minimum social order. It 
developed a rich apparatus, including specialized courts, a highly specif-
ic procedure and, of course, a powerful enforcement arm in the form of 
professional police forces. Thus emerged what has sometimes been de-
scribed as the “modern ideology of criminal justice,” one in which “[t]he 
victim is useful to the system primarily as an information source and a 
witness, and his interests . . . are not important to the operation of the 
system.”110 Thus, the State largely excluded the victim from participating 
in criminal procedures and reaped the full fine levied against the crimi-
nal.111 
A slow effort to reverse this state of affairs emerged in the twentieth 
century.112 In a classical criminal justice configuration, the operation of 
the criminal system, for the most part, prevented the victim from making 
a substantial recovery.113 However, if that system was to be broadly 
maintained (to vindicate the state, to protect the rights of the accused), 
the state owed it to victims who had been historically dispossessed of 
their primary role in the process to provide them with an alternative.114 
The problem was made worse by the fact that the state collected a fine 
first, long before the victims obtained a remedy, thus making it even 
more unlikely that they would obtain reparation. The state’s appetite for 
punishment, in other words, deprived victims of a full chance for person-
al recovery, except through the pursuit of tort remedies at their own ex-
pense.115 
The classical Italian criminologist Ferri was prompt to point out that 
often “the State cannot prevent crime, cannot repress it, except in a small 
number of cases, and consequently fails in its duty for the accomplish-
ment of which it receives taxes from its citizens, and then, after all that, it 
                                                                                                             
 110. Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a 
Change, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 24 (1984). 
 111. In particular, victims can typically not effect a private settlement with the offend-
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accepts a reward.”116 Schafer has also emphasized that there is something 
“absurd” about a system in which “the state undertakes to protect the 
public against crime and then, when a loss occurs, takes the entire pay-
ment and offers no effective remedy to the victim.”117 This situation is 
arguably made worse by the tendency of the state to criminalize areas 
traditionally occupied solely by torts, thereby further removing the pros-
pect of reparation.118 
Compensation schemes, in light of all this, are justified in that they 
correct the historical injustice resulting from states interposing between 
offender and victim.119 In recent decades, following substantial crimino-
logical and penological evolutions, the goal has increasingly shifted to a 
desire to ensure that the person who committed the crime is required to 
pay reparation (sometimes called “restitution” or “indemnification”).120 
The notion that the offender should contribute to repair the harm caused 
is seen in the restorative justice movement as a progressive step that can 
help to mend some of the social bonds destroyed by crime121 and, ideally, 
restore a sense of moral equity between victim and offender. Those who 
emphasize victim participation in the design of remedies insist that it 
may foster a worthwhile sense of victim agency.122 Moreover, a particu-
lar line of thought specifically ties together restitution and offender reha-
bilitation,123 whilst some would even replace punishment entirely by 
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compensation and thus eradicate the distinction between crime and 
tort.124 Some law and economics scholars have also made the case that 
the obligation to pay compensation might be a further deterrence to crim-
inals, especially in cases where the amount of such compensation is sig-
nificantly higher than the level of a fine.125 
The possibility of reparations in the context of criminal justice can thus 
be understood as a development internal to the fundamental physiogno-
my of the criminal justice process, moving from a retributive126 to a resti-
tutive model of criminal justice (that is no longer so distinctly “crimi-
nal”).127 This development is inherently linked to the more general in-
crease in victim participation, and the ability for victims to weigh in on 
both procedure and sentencing.128 
A similar argument can no doubt be made in the ICC context, where 
the Assembly of States Parties arguably has even less of a claim to col-
lect fines for itself, even though it theoretically could have (at least for 
the Court’s operating budget). Historically, the international criminal 
justice system is certainly guilty of a preoccupation with the primacy of 
criminal justice, which sometimes obscured alternative mechanisms that 
might have been more victim centered.129 Given the disparity of means 
between state parties and victims, an international criminal justice system 
that finances itself through fines and restitution might be hard to justify. 
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Whilst the suggestion that offender restitution might have a deterrent 
effect internationally is clearly not convincing,130 the ICC compensation 
regime is certainly driven by a basic trend towards making international 
criminal justice more restorative131 in a way that is responsive to criti-
cisms of its excessive retributivism. The Rome Statute indicates that 
fines may be paid to the TFV for the purposes of reparation.132 The Court 
itself emphasizes that its “restorative function, complementing its puni-
tive function, is a key feature of the system established in Rome.”133 
In that respect, international criminal tribunals are in a productive ten-
sion with alternative mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation com-
missions,134 and traditional justice mechanisms135 that offer a more ex-
plicitly restorative framework for transition. One cannot help thinking 
that the objective competition of such bodies may have helped gear the 
ICC itself in a more restorative direction. The idea that victims benefit 
from receiving reparations directly from the convicted, and that repara-
tions may even be rehabilitative of the offender, also makes sense before 
international criminal tribunals. Such restorative inclination will certainly 
be seen as more in line with what many populations who have suffered 
from international crimes may come to expect from criminal justice.136 
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The problem of course, both domestically and internationally, is linked 
to the limitations of restitution and reparations. In an ideal world, the 
convicted person would indeed pay for the harm caused. It is he or she, 
after all, who has been found guilty of an offense which, although pre-
sented as an offense against the state throughout the history of criminal 
law, also remains a crime (or an intentional tort) committed against a 
particular victim.137 The biggest problem with relying on the accused for 
reparations, as highlighted in the 1950’s by Margery Fry, was that in 
many cases it was very unlikely that the person condemned would have 
the means to pay.138 Moreover, given the prevailing rates of crime reso-
lution and conviction, it was even less likely that the person responsible 
would ever be apprehended or convicted.139 In addition, in the domestic 
context, persons who have committed significant violent crimes are often 
imprisoned for substantial lengths, making it even more implausible that 
they will gather the necessary resources.140 Forcing the convicted to 
work and transferring the product of their labor to victims is a solution 
that is problematic in its own right and is only likely to be partial. 
Problems associated with this model of relying on the accused are, if 
anything, magnified in the context of international criminal justice. His-
torically, many international crimes go unresolved, many accused never 
or very tardily get apprehended, and trials are very drawn out when they 
occur at all.141 In addition, many of the accused before contemporary 
tribunals are indigent and the international community pays for their 
lawyers.142 If lack of financial means was a problem domestically, then it 
is an even bigger one internationally. The ability and appetite of individ-
uals to commit mass atrocities generally far outweighs their ability to pay 
for them. The ICC itself recognized that it will have an expectation man-
agement problem in relation to victims given the fact that “[t]he types of 
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crimes dealt with by the Court cause loss and suffering on a massive 
scale” and that “[t]he resources of individuals that might be convicted of 
having committed crimes and of the Trust Fund for Victims will be lim-
ited in comparison.”143 Moreover, the ICC adds its own limitations in 
terms of reparations, not least of which is its extreme selectivity in terms 
of who it prosecutes. This risks creating a class of “super victims”—
those select few who happen to be the victims of an individual con-
demned by the Court with, possibly, a special emphasis on those who 
choose and manage to participate in proceedings as victims of the ac-
cused.144 Finally, there may be a concern that international criminal jus-
tice will disrupt victims’ attempts to obtain civil justice; although, since 
there never was much of an avenue for that internationally or domestical-
ly, it is hard to argue that there has been a negative impact on interna-
tional civil remedies.145 
What should the solution be? Should it be left to chance whether one is 
a victim of someone who happens to be known, found, convicted, and 
able to “repair” the harm done? The domestic solution to this problem, as 
incarnated by victim compensation schemes, is to externalize the cost of 
crime to the whole community—what Jeremy Bentham described as 
“subsidiary satisfaction at the public expense.”146 In other words, victim 
compensation schemes also emerged to remedy what was, in essence, or 
at least primarily conceived as, a deficiency of the criminal system. The 
general inspiration for the schemes is, almost by definition, recognition 
that the consequences of certain crimes should be “absorbed” by the 
community and the costs spread so that all victims end up being compen-
sated.147 But this is truly a radical break from reparations that follow 
from guilt and this evolution cannot be entirely explained from within 
the dynamics of criminal justice, unlike offender/victim reparations. 
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Compensation schemes, although they draw on the reparatory intuition, 
also affect a fundamental shift away from reparations emanating from the 
accused to a more socialized mode of compensation.148 Identifying the 
basic justificatory core of compensation schemes as correcting some li-
mitations of the criminal system tells us something about the internal 
coherence of criminal justice; however, it seems to presume something 
which cannot be taken for granted, namely that the cost of this deficiency 
should be borne by the community. There is nothing in the logic of crim-
inal justice—in its simplest expression, that the guilty should answer for 
their crimes—that suggests a larger societal responsibility to victims. 
It thus remains unclear why the state—not to mention the “internation-
al community” or any of its varied instantiations—should step in to pro-
vide compensation if the guilty cannot. The fact that the state proposes to 
do so is no substitute for a theory of why such a scheme is desirable, nor 
what form it should take. One argument is that lack of reparation, apart 
from being the fortuitous result of the impecunious nature of the guilty, 
is in a very specific way the state’s doing, since it is the state that dis-
placed torts in creating criminal justice machinery geared towards retri-
bution. Internationally, the argument might accordingly be that the “in-
ternational community” or “state parties” have a responsibility to victims 
because the monopolizing thrust of international criminal justice displac-
es a variety of other efforts.149 This rationale is helpful, but far from con-
clusive. The mere fact that criminal justice displaces alternative modes of 
regulation of complex social problems does not by itself assign liability 
to the entity responsible for the displacement. After all, every social poli-
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cy has costs, and the state is not obliged to compensate for every side-
effect of a shift in regulatory focus. 
Domestically, such doubts have given rise to some of the most fertile 
reflections about the limits of criminal justice, and clarification can only 
be sought in further multi-disciplinary inquiries that locate criminal jus-
tice within a larger constellation of theories and institutions. Although 
the international community has been slow to provide alternatives, there 
is also a sense that international criminal justice and alternative modes of 
reparation are not a zero sum game and that other avenues, including 
domestic and international civil litigation,150 are being explored. If any-
thing, this makes the debate even more complex as the question becomes 
why the TFV is the best mechanism, as opposed to any number of other 
routes through which remedies can be obtained. Further, the ultimate 
rationale for a victim compensation scheme, such as the TFV, must be 
sought beyond the confines of criminal justice theory alone. 
B. Political Rationale: The TFV as a By-Product of Interest 
At a certain level, one can reduce the creation of domestic compensa-
tion schemes as well as the TFV, with its autonomous powers, to a ma-
nifestation of the converging political will of various actors and consti-
tuencies. Domestically, the rise of victims’ movements and certain 
shocking episodes of criminality played a big role. For example, the New 
York compensation scheme was created following the deadly stabbing, 
in front of his wife and infant daughter, of Arthur F. Collins by a drunken 
man after Collins tried to stop the man from bothering an elderly woman 
on the subway.151 The perception that Collins acted as a Good Samaritan 
and the particularly horrendous nature of the crime was instrumental in 
the adoption of the 1966 Executive Law that set up the fund.152 
Public campaigns often launch to redress a perceived imbalance be-
tween the state’s treatment of the accused and of victims,153 sometimes 
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with explicit, often conservative, political agendas.154 As has been 
pointed out, “[f]undamentally, programs designed to compensate persons 
injured by crimes of violence are attempts to placate a public opinion 
often unnerved and resentful of what is viewed as a rising tide of aggres-
sive criminal activity.”155 Indeed, these regimes have even been rationa-
lized as part of an effort by policy-makers to reduce the “demoralization 
costs” of leaving victims without compensation in a context where the 
perception is that the State ought to be involved.156 Some scholars also 
argue that compensation should be seen as part of a “labeling process” 
that designates and therefore constructs “proper” victims,157 possibly 
with a view to symbolically reject criminological ideas that seek to con-
struct the offender himself as a victim.158 In a more critical vein, com-
pensation schemes are also, arguably, a way of deflecting attention from 
real issues of crime and distributive justice.159 Finally, compensation 
funds may be created for much more immediate and mundane reasons, 
such as helping sustain affected industries.160 
Internationally, the emergence of the TFV might be considered a ma-
nifestation of a rising international victims’ rights movement, made poss-
ible by greater overtures by the international system to non-state actors. 
Undoubtedly, the Rome process and the evolution of the treaty institu-
tions in its aftermath owe much to the increasing organization of transna-
tional civil society.161 The existence of a very specialized NGO such as 
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the “Victims’ Rights Working Group” suggests a strong linkage between 
civil society and victims’ rights issues.162 Indeed, the TFV itself, in its 
operation, purports to work as a participatory institution, one that claims 
to be inspired in its day-to-day activities by encounters with victims.163 
A view of the TFV as somehow a manifestation of an international 
democratic ethos and the profound wishes of victims, however, is only 
partly convincing. Who is a “victim” is a contested terrain, and the no-
tion is by and large constructed by international criminal justice rather 
than the other way round. There cannot be said to exist an international 
“victims’ rights movement” of the sort that has sprung up in the West 
during the last half-century and which is at the origin of most domestic 
victim assistance schemes.164 Institutional groups such as the Victims’ 
Rights Working Group, a network of 300 civil society groups, speak on 
behalf of victims worldwide, rather than being composed of them. This 
may be because victims of international crimes belong to a category too 
vast and dispersed to ever see themselves as “international” victims, not 
to mention the sheer difficulty of organizing such a movement across 
borders. Rather, a group of mostly Western NGOs defended a focus on 
victims based on the transitional justice critique that international crimi-
nal justice was too retributivist and internationalist for its own good.165 
The actual level of participation of victims in TFV is difficult to assess 
given the paucity of information available, but the Fund is, ultimately, 
very much in charge of how it uses its funds. 
State interest is, of course, an alternative paradigm to explain the 
emergence of the TFV. Domestically, victim compensation schemes 
serve definite political agendas of governments who are intent on por-
traying themselves as “victim-sensitive.” Similarly, the support of state 
parties was essential in the creation of the TFV and its fortunes may de-
pend on how much it is deemed worthy of support by the Assembly of 
States Parties.166 Doubtless, some states likely see the TFV as a way of 
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enhancing their liberal reputation through generous “donations,” which 
provide a high visibility vehicle for certain donor initiatives. However, 
the fact that states cannot earmark their donations167 also limits their abil-
ity to use the TFV for targeted political reasons. Moreover, it would be 
quite reductionist to suggest that the TFV was created merely to show-
case donor generosity, even if that is one of its side-effects. 
If there is a politics behind the TFV, it lies, rather, in the larger politi-
cal needs of international criminal justice, from which it is inseparable. 
Perhaps more than a “victims’ movement,” there has been a political sen-
sitivity in diplomatic circles to the role of victims in legitimizing a nas-
cent institution like the International Criminal Court.168 Certainly, in an 
international system where societal interest still seems relatively thin 
(despite all aspirations to the contrary) and which is deprived of a global 
sovereign, the traditional criminal law appeal to “public order” as the 
backbone of international criminal justice has little resonance and would 
elicit strong adverse reactions. In a context where many claims about 
international criminal justice are routinely challenged (e.g., that justice 
leads to peace), and where victims may in fact also become collateral 
victims of its operation (e.g., where a state expels humanitarian organiza-
tions as a result of the head of state having been indicted by the 
Court),169 there is much need for symbolic counterweights. Although 
victims may conceivably be able to live with some of the international 
decisions that adversely affect them if they advance justice overall, it 
would add insult to injury if the Court were to further neglect them by 
not providing any compensation. A strong and visible stand for victims 
of international crimes may be the international community’s best bet at 
establishing a solid vantage point from which to promote international 
criminal justice.170 
More concretely, there is little doubt that the emergence of a relatively 
strong reparation regime results, at least partly, from the difficulties that 
international criminal tribunals encountered in the 1990’s. The ad hoc 
tribunals, especially, were seen as excessively focused on prosecutions, 
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to the detriment of their larger transitional goals.171 Victim movements in 
Rwanda and Bosnia (in particular, Srebrenica) were often appalled by the 
way in which they were neglected, with often very dramatic conse-
quences for the tribunals in terms of state cooperation.172 International 
criminal lawyers know that justice cannot afford to appear careless about 
victims. The argument that international criminal justice serves victims’ 
merely by prosecuting their tormentors will only go so far. A strong vic-
tim oriented regime, then, can be redeeming of the general abstraction of 
international criminal justice and may help dispel the perception of indif-
ference to victims. The TFV might be conceived as, or turn into some-
thing, that helps reconcile local populations with international criminal 
tribunals. A cynic might therefore argue that a relatively strong victim 
compensation regime is the “acceptable face” of international criminal 
justice, a way of helping grease the wheels of the system by better “sell-
ing” it to its “stakeholders.” 
There are several limitations with this explanation, however. To begin 
with, the TFV shows no sign of wanting to serve as the “acceptable face” 
of the ICC vis-à-vis victims. In fact, it seems quite keen to distance itself 
from the Court.173 The TFV, thus, cannot really be explained as a swee-
tener for the occasional bitter pill of international trials. Purely political 
explanations of why the TFV exists provide us with a context but fail to 
provide us with a normative account of its emergence, despite the fact 
that the victims’ reparations regime is clearly construed by many of the 
actors involved as a normative enterprise. The same sort of argument 
could be made about international criminal tribunals in general: although 
they may have been created for various circumstantial political reasons, 
they have typically evaded these reasons and have been justified by ref-
erence to certain fundamental legal principles. Thus, a purely political 
account is necessarily lacking and a more complete analysis of the ratio-
nale behind victims’ compensation regimes must delve into a more nor-
mative register. 
C. Consequentialist Rationale: The TFV and Transitions 
Another species of arguments about the creation of compensation 
schemes emphasizes, quite apart from the moral, legal, or social merit of 
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granting something to victims, the extent to which such schemes have 
positive, secondary effects. These consequentialist arguments run the 
gamut from basic to sophisticated, but the underlying idea is utilitarian, 
going as far back as Bentham, that victim compensation is justified by—
and therefore also awarded on the basis of—what it might achieve, rather 
than by an entitlement or by the strict degree of harm suffered.174 Can the 
TFV be explained in such terms? Traces in the emergence of the regime 
indicate that it may be designed not simply as the acceptable face of in-
ternational criminal justice, but as something that is fundamentally con-
ducive to certain goals of international law, for example, transitional jus-
tice.175 
The problem then becomes, as is often the case with consequentialist 
reasoning, how to determine what the “ulterior goals” of victim compen-
sation should be. Perhaps one of the simplest lines of argument domesti-
cally is the idea that victim compensation schemes create a stake for vic-
tims in criminal justice and thus encourage them to cooperate with the 
judicial process in what might otherwise be a context of apathy or indif-
ference, amplified by fears of “double victimization” at the hands of 
prosecutors and a careless criminal system.176 Some domestic systems 
even make compensation conditional upon cooperation with police and 
prosecuting authorities.177 Some law and economics scholars even argue 
that, given the right level of restitution or compensation incentive, vic-
tims might well invest their own resources to have the criminals appre-
hended.178 However, domestically, the results of this sort of simple eco-
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nomic incentive have been decidedly mixed179 in that the decision to 
cooperate with judicial institutions seems largely unrelated to prospects 
for compensation.180 
The experience of the international community in the 1990’s demon-
strated that tribunals need to mobilize stakeholders, particularly wit-
nesses, a process often fraught with difficulties and misunderstand-
ings.181 Ideally, this may be accomplished by creating a rough quid pro 
quo, or at least a system of positive incentives to encourage cooperation. 
The strategy was attempted in the limited context of witness protection 
but, with the advent of the ICC, arguably extends to a vast number of 
victims seeking reparations or assistance. The eagerness with which vic-
tims participate in ICC proceedings thus far may have to do with a desire 
to be well positioned to make claims for reparation. The TFV, however, 
certainly does not go as far as to require cooperation by relevant victims, 
and assistance seems largely disconnected from even the existence of a 
proceeding.182 It is unlikely that the prospect of compensation would 
greatly change victim attitudes towards the judicial process in view of 
the fact that victims will most likely seek to participate on other grounds. 
A second “ulterior goal” is that victim compensation is, essentially, a 
way of limiting violence by reducing victims’ feelings of despair and 
alienation.183 The reasoning is that un-assisted crime victimization will 
come back to haunt society by feeding a desire for vengeance and vi-
olence. Compensation money, then, is money well spent in that it can 
avoid breaches to public order and peace and is often seen as a form of 
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“crime prevention,” almost an auxiliary to the criminal justice system.184 
A compensated victim is less likely to take justice in her own hands, or at 
least to seek alternative modes of justice.185 Ferri has already cautioned 
against the “law itself becom[ing] the breeding ground of personal re-
venge” if nothing is done for victims to break cycles of violence.186 
These arguments may, in fact, be more relevant in the sort of perilous 
transitional contexts that the ICC deals with than they ever were domes-
tically. Domestically, after all, this idea that victim compensation will 
prevent mob justice is something of a fiction; for many centuries victims 
did not receive any compensation from the state, yet only in exceptional 
circumstances did they resort to extreme measures. In complex and vola-
tile transitional contexts, however, the opposite may be true, and the 
temptation to take justice into one’s own hands is ever present, as shown 
by episodes of brutal transition involving summary executions and sa-
vage épuration.187 In this context, the TFV might be properly viewed as 
an institution devoted to the process of normalization of societies after 
atrocities by addressing needs of victims and ensuring that the system is 
not letting them down. Indeed, one might argue that in transitional con-
texts, criminal justice is never just pursued for its own sake, and its suc-
cess is necessarily measured by how it helps to accomplish peaceful tran-
sitions. Victim compensation, then, might be seen as a prolongation of 
criminal justice, allowing it to truly deliver on its promise of pacification. 
For example, upon announcing a donation of 500,000 Euros by his gov-
ernment to the TFV, the Danish ambassador emphasized that: 
[H]elp[ing] the victims of these crimes regain their dignity and enable 
them to return to a normal life . . . is an absolutely necessary element in 
ending a conflict and reconciling the different sides without which con-
flict will soon erupt again. In this way the Trust Fund for Victims, as a 
part of the overall framework of the ICC, complements the judicial    
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activities of the Court and plays a very important role in ending im-
punity and preventing the most serious crimes.188 
Another interesting view on domestic compensation schemes emanat-
ing from a law and economics angle is that “if we make the government 
responsible for the losses incurred by victims of crime, the government 
will then have an incentive to make communities safer for its citizens.”189 
The criminal justice system, albeit nominally in charge, is always a little 
suspect of wanting to combat crime “on the cheap.” In other words, the 
system never fully internalizes the overall cost of crime and is happy to 
leave its personal costs to victims, absorbing only a fraction of its overall 
social cost (the judicial trial and punishment). As a result, the state ends 
up treating the problem of victim harm as an unfortunate private one 
beyond its reach; the cost of crime is “dumped” on private citizens that 
end up indirectly subsidizing the state. Conversely, as one author pointed 
out in the 1950’s, if Margery Fry’s scheme was transposed to the US, 
social compensation of victims would cost “$20,000,000,000, or about 
seven percent of the national income of the United States”—surely an 
amount that would strikingly convey the actual cost of crime.190 In this 
interesting twist, it is not the victim/witness that is made to pay attention 
to the benefits of the criminal justice system, but the system itself which 
is forced to take into account the real cost of crime. There is probably 
some sense in suggesting that if the true cost of international crimes were 
to be factored into international policy (and at least the emphasis on the 
TFV supplementing reparation orders suggests this sort of direction), 
then it might create some renewed awareness by the international com-
munity of what is at stake and the urgency of bringing it to an end.191 
However, in practice this is very theoretical since contributions to the 
fund are voluntary and donors can effectively refuse to shoulder the full 
cost of crime and still bask in the relative generosity of their donations. 
The third and more sophisticated line of domestic arguments about 
what can be achieved through compensation emphasizes the extent to 
which crime “ruptures” faith in the institutions of the state, the law, and 
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society.192 Crime provokes alienation and undermines public trust. The 
rationale for providing either assistance or a complement to reparation, 
then, is to encourage respect for and trust in the criminal justice system 
and, additionally, in the institutions of the state. Crime, quite literally, 
shatters the bonds of society. As David Miers puts it, “to experience 
crime is to experience a failure in civic trust; that is, in the trust that citi-
zens have (and are encouraged to have) in the capacity of the criminal 
justice system to protect them.”193 To the extent that crime is typically 
associated with a breakdown of society’s structures, the solidarity ex-
pressed through victim compensation schemes serves to reinstate society 
as organized, caring, and responsible. “Civic trust” in this context “may 
be thought to require that the law ought not only show a concern for the 
victim’s injury but also take concrete measures to restore the harm done 
to public trust and confidence.”194 The civic trust argument provides a 
justification for “special treatment” of victims by the state in that “unlike 
other forms of hardship such as those caused by road accidents, industrial 
accidents and diseases, congenital disabilities, or even another’s negli-
gence, crime victims have, stereotypically, suffered injuries that were 
inflicted ‘deliberately,’ or more precisely, intentionally or recklessly.”195 
This focus on victims as “the target of another’s ill-will and not just of 
another’s inadvertence”196 is what justifies state intervention to remedy a 
fundamental breach of trust in the institutions of society.197 
The last ulterior goal of setting up compensation schemes is less intui-
tive in the international context compared to the domestic setting, but it 
does yield some interesting suggestions. The starting point, one might 
argue, is startlingly different from the domestic setting in that the interna-
tional community is in many ways marked by abysmal levels of civic 
trust.198 It is probably fair to say that after the failure to bomb the 
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Auschwitz railroad, the pulling out of UNAMIR in Rwanda, or UN 
peacekeepers helping Mladic sort out able men from the rest of the popu-
lation in Srebrenica, victims’ expectations of the international communi-
ty are rather low. Ad hoc international criminal tribunals, from Nurem-
berg to the Hague, have probably not made very good impressions on 
most victims.199 International society, one might argue, suffers chronical-
ly, not so much from a rupture of faith in its judicial institutions as from 
a permanent crisis of trust in them. Still, there is no doubt that interna-
tional crimes have often left victims even further alienated from and pro-
foundly disillusioned with the international society, more so probably 
than is the case domestically. The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (“IACHR”) emphasized that grave human rights violations are not 
like an ordinary tort in that they fundamentally alter a person’s belief in 
the possibility of a secure life.200 The fact that levels of international civ-
ic trust are generally low, then, militates in favor of trying to restore con-
fidence in international institutions and the rule of law, and victim com-
pensation can be a part of this process. 
Finally, there is also a sense in which compensation in the context of 
atrocity serves a broader role that it need not serve domestically. Domes-
tically, compensation has the goal of averting the alienation of victims 
but, aside from maintaining a certain public confidence in the notion of a 
just society, it is in no way meant to more generally reconstruct or mend 
societies from the ground up. Conversely, international compensation 
arguably has such a role in that it is more broadly about building the 
foundations of a lasting peace, based on the integrity of victims and the 
rule of law.201 TFV authorities are clearly quite aware that they are also, 
in assisting victims, striving towards this more long-term goal. The 
Fund’s draft strategic plan specifically emphasizes that “[t]he interna-
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tional community can and must help [victims] to consolidate peace, en-
sure justice and overcome the legacies of war.”202 
There is a sense that consequentialist rationales account for part of the 
existence of the TFV, but their normative status is open to question. Even 
though the TFV may achieve some or all of these goals, chances are that 
it will do so indirectly without specifically intending to. In other words, 
some of the results indicated above are results that would flow naturally 
from most dynamic compensation policies and that cannot be directly 
engineered. There is not much evidence that these rationales featured 
prominently when victim compensation was discussed in Rome and 
beyond, largely because reparations discourse dominated, emphasizing 
issues of principle rather than consequence. Consequentialist reasoning 
also does not help us much to understand the type of compensation that 
the Fund should engage in. It remains difficult, in fact, to envisage the 
TFV’s role in exclusively consequentialist, “spill-over” terms. If that 
were its fundamental rationale, then any number of alternative mechan-
isms might be up to the task and perhaps better suited to it.203 For exam-
ple, reparations and assistance might be delegated to truth and reconcilia-
tion mechanisms that would have a more explicit mandates to facilitate 
transition. The TFV still needs to be able to make a claim that it will ex-
ecute its functions better than these competing programs or mechanisms. 
D. Practical Rationale: the TFV as a Substitute to Other Mechanisms 
A fourth type of justification for domestic victim compensation 
schemes emphasizes the extent to which they are essentially filling a 
void and replacing faulty or insufficient alternatives. These arguments, 
which are often joined with others explored in this Article, are practical 
in that they do not deduce the need for compensation schemes from any 
principled higher ground. Rather, assuming the need for some sort of 
compensation, they point out the optimality of a socialized scheme given 
the dearth of alternatives. As previously mentioned, victim compensation 
schemes, almost by definition, aim to provide an answer to the limita-
tions of the criminal-reparatory system in cases where the accused either 
cannot be apprehended or are insolvent. The case that still needs to be 
made is the extent to which compensation schemes also replace or com-
plement other mechanisms that might conceivably step in to assist vic-
tims. 
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Domestically, the classic argument is that compensation schemes are a 
substitute to two possible alternatives: insurance and torts.204 The first 
issue, insurance, might seem of largely theoretical interest in the interna-
tional context, were the argument not made so strongly domestically. The 
idea is that the state, in providing victim compensation, substitutes for 
the absence or failure of insurance mechanisms when it comes to violent 
crime, for which specific insurance may not be available or accessible to 
everyone given its high cost.205 Even if insurance is theoretically availa-
ble, the “argument is that the risk of injury from criminal attack is so re-
mote that it would be impractical to insure against that risk.”206 Moreo-
ver, the fact that one may insure oneself against being a victim of crime 
but not against being guilty of one, limits, in contrast to civil liability, the 
extent to which economically optimal insurance schemes can be put in 
place. 
One might thus analyze compensation schemes as a form of govern-
ment intervention in a dysfunctional insurance market. Insurers have oc-
casionally been required to form “risk pools” to guarantee against such 
events as terrorist attacks, for which ordinary insurance schemes may be 
of limited utility.207 The argument draws on the theory of “market fail-
ures”—9/11 provides the starkest example to date—to suggest that the 
state should intervene in cases where the market will not, of itself, pro-
vide adequate mechanisms.208 In cases of major catastrophes, the gov-
ernment will act as a reinsurer of risk through public-private partnerships 
that minimize the risk of default.209 In fact, victim compensation will 
sometimes be loosely referred to as “crime insurance” (although not 
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quite adequately, since it is not typically financed by specific individual 
contributions as much as general taxation, and the sums awarded will 
often not match what might have been obtained under insurance policies 
had they existed).210 
When it comes to international crimes, insurance failure seems largely 
inadequate to rationalize the TFV. This is not only because there is a 
dearth of insurance (there will indeed most often be none at all)211 but 
that the TFV is not a substitute to a system that has failed, as much as its 
own, sui generis source of compensation.212 It may, in fact, be next to 
impossible to insure oneself against mass crimes in the first place, as a 
result, for example, of a quite widespread “war exclusion” in insurance 
contracts.213 In many cases, obtaining insurance against the risk of geno-
cide or crimes against humanity might be the equivalent ofobtaining a 
health insurance policy as one is showing the first signs of cancer. The 
outcome is that, as is the case domestically, those most likely to need 
crime insurance and least able to afford it will be those for whom it will 
be most expensive. Perhaps some states could, in theory, insure them-
selves and their population against the consequences of international 
crimes, although probably not many of those where mass crimes are like-
ly to be committed will do so. Making insurance compulsory, moreover, 
does not seem like an option because the international community is ob-
viously in no position to require it. There may also be something morally 
awkward about insuring or being made to insure oneself against genocide 
or crimes against humanity in the same way one might be expected to 
ensure oneself against car accidents, loss of work, or ill health (especially 
if the state is insuring itself). Asking individuals to insure themselves 
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against crime (even on a subsidized basis) might suggest a “normaliza-
tion” of crime and even that the State has given up on preventing it (or 
that society has given up on the State).214 
A second practical justification of victim schemes, which is more ap-
pealing in the international context, is that they are an alternative to civil 
remedies, which victims might otherwise have to seek and which are ei-
ther unavailable, very hard to pursue, or generally inadequate to the 
needs of victims.215 In practice there is much evidence that victims of 
crime often never seek tortious remedies.216 The fundamental logic be-
hind a scheme such as the UK victim compensation scheme, for exam-
ple, is to “meet the gap between the ‘ideal world’” in which “it should be 
the offender who compensates the victim” and the “reality of the victim’s 
theoretical civil remedy.”217 Indeed, there seems to be almost universal 
agreement about the difficulty of collecting civil reparations in cases of 
crimes, for essentially the same reason that there is skepticism about the 
criminal system obtaining reparations from the convicted.218 The tenden-
cy to move beyond torts altogether through mechanisms “socializing re-
sponsibility” is one that has been considered seriously in limited areas, 
such as medical malpractice, environmental pollution, or automobile ac-
cidents.219 
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Civil remedies are of little use when those responsible are either un-
known or un-apprehended, as will frequently be the case. Moreover, 
many victims may simply be discouraged by the prospect of pursuing 
civil remedies (particularly because of costs), although such a problem is 
attenuated in jurisdictions that allow the possibility of victim participa-
tion in criminal proceedings (e.g., the institution of parties civiles in 
some continental-European legal systems)220 or where a criminal verdict 
binds civil jurisdictions.221 Compensation schemes are, thus, sometimes 
presented as expedients that save victims from the cost and effort of civil 
proceedings. In fact, opting into these schemes may render victims in-
eligible to sue those they consider responsible, as is the case under the 
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act.222 In cases 
where the victims choose to forgo suit in order to benefit from compen-
sation, the public authority will then be subrogated to the rights of the 
victim against the perpetrator, thus ensuring that the victim does not 
doubly recover.223 These sorts of schemes fall under the “offender surro-
gate model” in that the state essentially pays the reparation that the con-
victed person might otherwise pay.224 Indeed, until 1996 the amount that 
one could claim under the British scheme used to be calculated on the 
basis of what one would have received in a successful civil action against 
the offender.225 Claims that one is the victim of a crime generally have to 
be proved on a balance or preponderance of probabilities, the civil stan-
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dard.226 In some cases the state or an agency in its name will seek to re-
cover the expenses incurred from the convicted, for example in Florida 
and Illinois.227 
Nonetheless, even domestically the “compensation as substitute to 
tort” argument is not very convincing. Reluctance to engage in civil suits 
is a general problem (i.e., even outside situations of crime) that does not 
normally militate in favor of the state simply replacing private litigants. 
One still needs to explain why victims of certain torts should be treated 
differently, merely because these torts also happen to be crimes.228 There 
are plenty of social harms for which society offers no compensation, 
leaving it entirely to victims to shoulder the cost of either litigation in 
torts or the cost of the harm when legal redress is not possible. If any-
thing, moving to a “no-fault” compensation scheme in case of crime is 
less likely than for other ordinary social harms, given the extent to which 
crime seems predicated on fault, a point that risks being lost when the 
state decides to shoulder a significant part of the harm. 
On the other hand, looking at the experience and limitations of domes-
tic and transnational litigation, one can see the merit of the “civil litiga-
tion alternative” in the international context. The international system is 
one where civil remedies hardly exist, especially if they are not available 
in the forum where the crimes were committed. The Alien Tort Claims 
Act (“ATCA”) is the only remedy of its kind internationally, allowing 
victims of violations of international law to seek compensation in the US 
regardless of where the harm was incurred.229 The number of victims of 
atrocities, at any rate, makes transnational civil remedies a very costly 
and long process to obtain reparations and has, in practice, raised all 
kinds of collective action problems.230 Maybe the exceptional lack of tort 
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remedies is an argument for the TFV, as a sort of substitute to protracted 
ATCA-type litigation or various other mass claims.231 
But there is little evidence that the TFV will act as a substitute to non-
existent tort remedies, or that it will be operating under the “offender 
surrogate model.” To do so, it would need to commit to systematically 
“complement” insufficient reparations by the convicted, something 
which at present does not seem likely.232 It is certainly not anticipated 
that the TFV will exercise any sort of subrogation rights against either 
the accused or any other entity (such as the state that committed the 
crimes) to recoup the sums expended in favor of victims. Nor is there any 
suggestion that the TFV contributing to reparation might disqualify vic-
tims from suing responsible parties, especially if they are other than the 
accused.233 Finally, the point remains that it is not obvious why the inter-
national community should fund compensation as an alternative to civil 
litigation, simply because civil litigation is complicated. Domestically, 
the argument might be that the state is answerable for some of the defi-
ciencies and limitations of its own judicial system (so that compensation 
schemes are a way of correcting the inadequacy of civil remedies for a 
particular kind of “meritorious” victims). But this reasoning is harder to 
sustain internationally because the “international community” does not 
have a civil law system of its own and it is effectively relying on states’ 
judicial systems. 
All of these arguments as to how victim schemes might act as a com-
plement or substitute to alternative mechanisms help explain the envi-
ronment domestically and internationally. However, that explanation is 
not entirely conclusive. The fact that neither insurance, nor tortious re-
sponsibility, nor state programs will be present or sufficient is certainly 
an argument for why the TFV, in most cases, will not be duplicating ex-
isting initiatives; but it does not explain why the “international communi-
ty” should fundamentally assume the cost of the externalization of victim 
harm, nor does it tell us much about how it should do so, and according 
to what logic. The simple availability of funds and willingness of the “in-
ternational community” to give is obviously something that makes the 
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scheme conceivable, but not a very satisfactory answer as to why it exists 
in the form that it does. 
E. Legal Rationale: The TFV as an Admission of Responsibility 
Among the arguments militating in favor of the creation of victim 
compensation schemes domestically, some are clearly more law-oriented 
and suggest that victim compensation is based on, or at least owed, in 
cases where the public authorities have, or would have, incurred liability. 
Jeremy Bentham, one of the first persons to suggest the creation of vic-
tim compensation schemes, suggested that the state should compensate 
victims whenever “evils result[ed] from unintentional mistakes of the 
ministers of justice,”234 or in other words, when they acted negligently. 
In that case, Bentham argued: 
[O]ught not the public to follow the same rules of equity which it im-
poses upon individuals? Is it not an odious thing that the government 
should exert its power to exact severely all that is due to it, and should 
avail itself of the same means to refuse the payment of its own 
debts?235 
This is clearly not as radical a concept now as it was when first sug-
gested by Bentham. The basis, then, might be a form of liability for neg-
ligence. The state, in compensating victims, would be more or less for-
mally acknowledging its status as a “tortfeasor where its negligence in 
preventing criminal activity causes citizens to be injured.”236 There have 
long been attempts in certain countries, despite doctrines of sovereign 
immunity,237 to bring cases against the authorities as “secondary tortfea-
sors” for failure to offer reasonable protection,238 at least in cases where 
the occurrence of crime is specifically tied to a police failure.239 This 
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trend has only been reinforced in recent years by human rights dis-
course240 and is much more familiar to continental systems of law than to 
common law systems. Some have linked it explicitly to the emergence of 
victim compensation schemes.241 
However, when providing compensation schemes, most states do not 
view the program as preemptive of potential cases that might be brought 
against them, for example, pursuant to administrative law.242 Compensa-
tion funds typically do not have a mandate to examine the record of 
states’ behavior, even though dismal levels of protection of individuals 
may influence the amount of compensation given. There have been few 
suggestions that compensation schemes involve any change to doctrines 
of sovereign immunity.243 If there is to be a strong legal obligation to 
compensate, it seems, it will be only of the sort that states have assumed 
as a matter of political choice,244 rather than one that flows from recogni-
tion of responsibility.245 States will thus grant compensation even in cas-
es where they are not at fault, and they will also resist attempts to specif-
ically tie disbursements to a finding of fault. In fact, in some cases, vic-
tim schemes involve an explicit bypassing of the idea of state responsi-
bility altogether: victims are often offered a quick settlement in exchange 
for waiving any attempt to sue the state or, indeed, a number of private 
third parties.246 
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Responsibility in any strict sense is also largely unrelated to the TFV’s 
efforts. It is true that the failure by the international community to pre-
vent genocide or crimes against humanity comes closest to the few tradi-
tionally actionable torts on a domestic level that involve the state in the 
field of protection from crime247 (such as failure to prevent a civil 
riot).248 Nonetheless, there is not a trace in the ICC/TFV regime of link-
ing compensation to some sort of “international community responsibili-
ty” for failure to prevent international crimes. NGOs have cautioned 
against linking compensation to the notion of responsibility, out of fear 
that the latter may be hard to establish or perpetually unclear following 
mass atrocities.249 This should not come as a surprise: the international 
community is merely a conceit, it does not have a legal personality, and 
it would probably benefit from a host of immunities if it did.250 If any-
thing, the ICC and the TFV are generally represented by their supporters 
as heroic attempts to fly to the rescue of victims, not acts of penitent con-
trition by the international community for its faults in allowing victims to 
become victims. 
Nor is there any suggestion that the TFV might have as one of its bases 
the liability of some states for failure to prevent international crimes. It is 
true that the idea of the “responsibility to protect” in international human 
rights law now increasingly makes states responsible not only for the acts 
of previous governments, but also for the harm inflicted by non-state ac-
tors which they failed to prevent.251 The drafters of the Rome Statute 
swiftly excluded proposals that would have tied the TFV to findings of 
state responsibility,252 and there is at present no clear indication that 
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states should “assume any shortfall if perpetrators are insolvent.”253 The 
operation of the Court itself is entirely bound to the notion of individual 
criminal responsibility, and no link is anticipated with an institution of 
state responsibility such as the ICJ. The TFV clearly has no power to 
order states to pay compensation, and it is hard to see how “voluntary 
contributions” by such states to the TFV could be seen as an admission 
of responsibility unless—which is highly unlikely—a state were to expli-
citly say as much. In practice, were there to be suggestions that voluntary 
contributions are a back door to responsibility, states would probably do 
everything they could to dispel that idea. This, of course, does not ex-
clude state or even international institutions’ responsibility, but these will 
have to be sought in other fora, and are distinct from what the Rome in-
stitutions are about.254 
If the issue were one of responsibility, the international community 
would most likely direct attention away from itself and towards the state 
that either committed international crimes or allowed them to be commit-
ted. In fact, it is already quite clear that responsibility has no more real 
role to play in compensation internationally than it did domestically. The 
ICC/TFV regime might even limit victim actions in responsibility (under 
tort, administrative, or international law) by providing them with enough 
compensation to take their attention away from the responsible state.255 
What is striking is how small a role strictly legal principles seem to play 
in the genesis and functioning of the TFV. 
F. Rights Rationale: The TFV and the Right to Reparation and/or Assis-
tance 
An alternative to seeing victim compensation based on some form of 
even implicit negligence liability is to see it as flowing from a “right,” 
even a human right. The reasoning is that regardless of fault, the state 
should act as the ultimate guarantor of a victim’s right to compensation. 
The focus is not on liability and the very complex problems it raises, but 
on the harm and the absolute need for some sort of remedy. The beauty 
of rights reasoning, therefore, is that it may open the way to an absolute 
                                                                                                             
 253. Ioana-Alina Apreotesei, The Victims of the Crimes Under the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court—Some Aspects of Legal Responsibility, 4 MISKOLC J. INT’L 
L. 95, 103 (2007). 
 254. There is no provision in the Rome Statute that would allow the Court to discuss 
state responsibility for the crimes involved, even though dealing with former heads of 
state may indirectly have that effect. 
 255. If victims obtain a satisfying level of compensation from the TFV, one might 
expect that this would relieve some of the pressure bearing on the state, a somewhat 
strange situation given the statute’s position in favor of complementarity. 
174 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
responsibility of the state (or whatever state substitute) to either guaran-
tee reparations or provide assistance, whilst avoiding complex and politi-
cally sensitive issues of liability. Margery Fry notably relied on rights 
arguments to justify the implementation of victim compensation pro-
grams.256 Some scholars have argued that a “justice model,” emphasizing 
victims’ rights to compensation, is preferable to the voluntary “needs-
based” approach.257 There is occasional talk of a “right not to be a vic-
tim,”258 and rights discourse has had powerful effect in shaping the polit-
ical side of victims’ efforts at recognition.259 
Some jurisdictions—New Zealand and Northern Ireland, for in-
stance—have compensation schemes that recognize a duty to compensate 
victims based on a victim’s rights.260 Some also argue that New Jersey, 
because of its Crime Victims Bill of Rights, is the state that comes clos-
est to recognizing a right to a remedy against the state for the commis-
sion of crimes.261 Courts occasionally recognize that the fact that the 
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state offers compensation creates a right to such compensation for vic-
tims who fit the criteria.262 Moreover, some US states, such as Hawaii, 
anticipate an annual appropriation for awards already made, which again 
suggests something close to a guarantee.263 The fact that in some juris-
dictions victim compensation schemes are administered by courts (e.g., 
Northern Ireland, Massachusetts, New South Wales, and Queensland), 
also reinforces the sense that public compensation is, by nature, an en-
titlement.264 
However, overall, rights-based approaches have not fared very well 
domestically and are considered to generally offer a poor rationale for 
compensation schemes.265 As Kent Roach put it, rights discourse has 
been used “as both a rhetorical and a legal device,” but “the assertion of 
rights is not the whole or perhaps the most important part of recognizing 
and respecting crime victims.”266 States are often fearful of opening the 
floodgates and resist attempts to legally rigidify the grounds of compen-
sation.267 Moreover, strong fears have been expressed, more generally, 
about framing the position of victims in the criminal justice system as 
one of rights,268 which unavoidably affects the way compensation itself 
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is understood. “Assistance” is even less susceptible to analysis in terms 
of rights,269 although it is not inconceivable that some victims would 
come to see it as such. 
Internationally, the situation, or at least the normative starting point, is 
different and, perhaps a little paradoxically, more dominated by notions 
of rights. This is because of the way in which the international victims’ 
regime270 was constructed: not so much as a prudent move towards re-
cognizing the legitimacy of certain legislative claims based on available 
resources, as a full-blown trumpeting of a “right to reparation,” especial-
ly in cases of grave human rights violations (which international crimes 
generally entail). The UN, in particular, laid the groundwork for a strong 
international regime, recognizing a right to an effective remedy.271 One 
of the corollaries of such a right, outlined in several key UN soft law in-
struments, is an increasingly recognized right to reparation.272 
The question is, of course, who is to be the guarantor of that right to 
reparation? In a sense, it was relatively easy for international institutions 
to encourage the logic of a “right to reparation” since the duty to com-
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pensate is assumed primarily by the state. However, proclaiming a right 
to reparation might also bind the international community when it creates 
its own institutions of international criminal justice, especially when the 
state most directly concerned defaults on its obligation. In the context of 
international criminal justice, if the convicted individual cannot pay the 
ordered reparation, a glaring gap appears that in theory, should be filled 
by the state that was involved in or tolerated the crimes. The problem is 
that the state is often not willing or able to prosecute the person in the 
first place, and is probably therefore also unwilling or unable to pay re-
paration to victims.273 Perhaps, having proclaimed reparation as a human 
right and set up an institution such as the Court that magnifies a sense of 
entitlement to reparation and assistance, pressure will come to bear on 
the state parties to the Rome Statute to guarantee that the right to repara-
tion is not turned into a mockery by the cumulative indigence of defen-
dants and unwillingness of the state concerned. At any rate, it may be 
difficult for an international institution like the TFV, which is immersed 
in all the best intentions of international law, to claim that it has no role 
in guaranteeing an internationally protected right. 
The idea of the “international community” acting as a “super-
guarantor” of a right to reparation, in the same way some domestic vic-
tim compensation schemes were originally conceived, is interesting but 
hardly the most plausible way to describe the TFV’s role. It is true that 
the TFV has provisioned money to complement reparations made by the 
convicted in order to respond to the full amount of the harm suffered by 
victims,274 in accordance with emerging ICC priorities. However, as has 
been pointed out, it is also difficult to see what the TFV will do if repara-
tions are ordered which go far beyond monies provisioned for that pur-
pose, or even beyond its budget. If the TFV does not consider itself 
bound to provide compensation on the basis of reparation logic, then it is 
probably even more unlikely that it would be willing to do so merely on 
the basis of rights. The argument in that case would probably be that the 
right should be exercised against the state normally responsible for gua-
ranteeing rights. The idea that assistance, as opposed to reparation, might 
be a matter of right is even less convincing, especially given the absence 
of any recourse to victims if such assistance is denied. There is some-
thing too discretionary about the operation of the TFV to see it as a strict-
ly rights-based institution. 
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G. Political Theory Rationale: The TFV as Honoring a Social Contract 
Given the failure, or at least the severe limitations, of a legal responsi-
bility or rights-based theory of publicly funded compensation schemes, 
more general theoretical grounds for compensation have been sought. 
The advantage of seeking a ground for the obligation that is more ab-
stract in nature is that it avoids the legal pitfalls inherent in framing the 
issue as one of responsibility or right. One common justification of this 
sort relies on social contract theory and the idea that the state, having 
bound itself to guarantee security within its borders, is liable for any 
breach of that contract.275 Given that “the king usurped the right of the 
citizen to restore equilibrium after a crime had been committed,”276 the 
state should endorse that responsibility to the fullest extent. The idea of 
the social contract as a foundation for security against crime is not purely 
theoretical since, for example, citizens pay taxes which in part go to es-
sential aspects of fulfilling this contract, such as law enforcement. 
It follows that the state should shoulder the costs of crime, regardless 
of whether actual negligence by it or its agents was involved, simply by 
virtue of having usurped alternative means of dealing with crime.277 
Another way of looking at it is that the right to compensation, if it exists, 
results from a strong representation by the state about its ability to pro-
vide security. “After all,” suggests Margery Fry, “the State which forbids 
our going armed in self-defence cannot disown all responsibility for its 
occasional failure to protect.”278 The idea is that the state is liable for all 
its failures to provide security because otherwise, citizens might be better 
served by seeking justice themselves. It is perhaps no surprise that 
amongst the most enthusiastic defenders of victim compensation were 
nineteenth century Italian criminologists, who were little impressed by 
the emerging Italian state’s ability to protect society from crime.279 
The argument is made more potent by the fact that provision of securi-
ty against interpersonal violence goes to the heart of the state’s tradition-
al significance. For example, the state is obviously not guaranteeing 
people against earthquakes or even against all forms of private criminali-
ty, but it might at the minimum be able to protect them against particular-
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ly rampant forms of crime.280 This is because the state, having claimed a 
legitimate monopoly of the means to deal with violence, is in a sense 
always broadly “responsible,” even if by omission, for the occurrence of 
crime.281 For example, in the US context, Childres has pointed out as a 
justification for compensation schemes, “the remarkable unresponsive-
ness of American institutions to the causes of crime, whether they be mi-
nority group ghettos, other slums, dope-addiction, organized crime, or an 
irrational tradition of violence.”282 The move, for the purposes of com-
pensation, to a notion of absolute liability for the occurrence of crimes in 
some contexts also suggests that one has moved away from a traditional 
liability model to the triggering of a sort of “guarantee.”283 The European 
Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, for ex-
ample, introduces “the principle of State responsibility for crime” as one 
of its cornerstones, suggesting that “the State is bound to compensate the 
victim because . . . it has failed to prevent the crime by means of effec-
tive criminal policy” or “it introduced criminal policy measures which 
have failed.”284 
It should be noted that these arguments have been criticized as not nec-
essarily implying anything like a right to remedy. As David Miers puts it, 
“[a]llowing that the state has an obligation to protect its citizens says no 
more than that it should provide a fair share of what might reasonably be 
allocated to such public goods . . . as law enforcement.”285 Moreover, 
one might make the argument that absolute liability goes too far and that 
the obligation can only be one of means (doing everything reasonably 
possible) and not one of result (guaranteeing that no crime is committed). 
In other words, the mere occurrence of crime does not imply a violation 
of the State’s basic duties in the absence of some significant shortcom-
ing.286 One might also argue that overall, citizens are better off having 
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relinquished means of private self-defense, and thus, the state does not 
particularly owe them anything.287 Still, broad brush social contractarian 
arguments in favor of compensation schemes do capture the unique polit-
ical responsibility of those entities that purport to provide security to oth-
ers. 
Are such theories applicable to the international context and, specifi-
cally, that of the Rome institutions’ efforts towards victims?288 This is a 
slightly speculative matter, and one that must draw on the registers of 
both jurisprudence and policy. There is nothing obvious about the idea of 
an international social contract. One might even want to stay away from 
the idea as much as possible as smacking too much of the domestic, not 
to mention the problematic liberal, conceptual baggage.289 The difference 
from a domestic social contract argument (if one were to push it a little) 
is that the international community is obviously not a state and has not 
“taken over” in terms of security (at least far from comprehensively). 
Even if one could discern the contours of a theoretical contract (or, per-
haps more precisely, a compact), one would still be faced with a distribu-
tion of power and responsibility that is much more complicated than the 
most complex of federal arrangements. 
Still, one key element of the idea behind the social contract conceit is 
that a representation is being made to citizens that certain fundamentally 
harmful events will not happen, or at least that everything possible will 
be done to prevent them from happening. There are inklings that suggest 
the international community has made, over the years, such a representa-
tion. In addition to the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and a resounding “never again” after the Holocaust, most 
states have made a solemn undertaking to “prevent and to punish” geno-
cide290 and to “respect and ensure respect” of the Geneva Conventions.291 
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Even if it is not, and does not want to be, a substitute for the state, the 
“international community” has arguably assumed a role as a last-resort 
guarantor of human security, especially (if not only) when it comes to 
international crimes. 
This is increasingly evident in such internationally promulgated con-
cepts as the “Responsibility to Protect” (“R2P”).292 The idea is that hu-
man beings’ fundamental security should not depend, ultimately, on the 
state one happens to be under the jurisdiction of, and that the internation-
al system will transcend its own reluctance to intervene in extreme cir-
cumstances where not to do so would lead to severe human destruc-
tion.293 The international community came close on several occasions to 
recognizing a form of systemic and residual responsibility for atrocities 
that were committed but could have been averted.294 The case is particu-
larly strong where the general promise to avoid the commission of 
crimes was renewed to the victims themselves, sometimes on the ground, 
and where the international community grossly failed those who en-
trusted their security in its hands.295 It is made particularly dramatic if the 
victims, trusting the international community to intervene on their behalf, 
have relinquished other efforts to protect themselves from harm.296 
A link, nonetheless, needs to be established between something that the 
international community did or failed to do and the commission of inter-
national crimes. Can the mere occurrence of genocide or war crimes on a 
mass scale reflect, to use the language of Childres, something like a “re-
markable unresponsiveness”297 by the international community? This is a 
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complex debate, but there is no doubt that the international community 
itself is deeply aware of its own limitations and responsibilities in the 
field of crime prevention298 and that genocides have occurred as a result 
of all sorts of contextual factors for which international criminal tribunals 
do not begin to do justice.299 The international community has, despite 
progress, failed in its meager efforts at both prevention and repression, 
and there remains a big gap between the theory and the reality of R2P. 
It remains to be seen whether this sense of honoring a commitment to 
human security—defined minimally here as freedom from the worst type 
of crimes—will in any way frame contributions to the TFV. For exam-
ple, if the Assembly of States Parties moved towards a more mandatory 
form of contribution (such as a fixed percentage of the court budget), 
then it might be seen as taking a step towards endorsing a notion of in-
ternational communal responsibility. One can also imagine more subtle 
scenarios in which the state where the crimes were committed would, in 
the course of a transition, make a donation to the TFV that could be in-
terpreted as the expression of a “moral obligation to contribute to the 
reparation of certain crimes” in a situation where it is nonetheless “not 
legally responsible under the Rome Statute.”300 
The truth, though, seems to be that the state parties, not to mention the 
international community at large, seem far from endorsing a strong 
commitment to guarantee reparation on the basis of some form of impli-
cit global social contract.301 There has been no suggestion that donations 
should be anything but voluntary. If anything, despite its failings in Con-
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go, the UN has acted quite defiantly towards the ICC302 and has not con-
tributed anything to the TFV. The TFV does not, in fact, “guarantee” 
anything and the belief is that major crimes are committed first and 
foremost by individuals who are allowed to follow their course by par-
ticular states (rogue or collapsed), and the crimes are not the international 
community’s fault.303 
H. Humanitarian Rationale: the TFV as a “Public Charity” 
Some victim compensation schemes can be seen as manifesting a com-
passionate ethos, not so different from that of a charitable agency.304 As 
one author put it in the Australian context, “The most satisfactory justifi-
cation for a [victim compensation] scheme is a purely pragmatic one—
that on humanitarian grounds the State should provide assistance to vic-
tims of crimes of violence, just as it helps the victims of other forms of 
misfortune.”305 It has also been said that “the basis . . . probably of all 
compensation plans, is a charitable impulse to assist those who suffer 
misfortune.”306 Early payments by compensation schemes were analyzed 
as “gratuities” or “public bounty.”307 
Such a humanitarian inspiration may draw on general feelings of em-
pathy towards victims, particularly after much publicized crimes. Huma-
nitarianism goes a little further than mere charity in that it typically in-
volves a sense of moral obligation to those suffering. Victim compensa-
tion schemes inspired by a humanitarian rationale are most likely to dis-
tance themselves from a strict reparations logic, in that the idea that one 
is granted reparations on the basis of charity is a contradiction in terms. 
Humanitarian justifications of victim compensation schemes emphasize 
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the moral obligation of donors, whether private or public. There is no 
right to assistance, but it is good if some is provided. 
It is plausible that some existing victim compensation schemes could 
be described as primarily humanitarian in purpose. The argument is 
sometimes made that “victims of crime quite frequently belong to a pop-
ulation stratum that can least afford the economic loss from crime.”308 In 
particular, the less permanent schemes that receive funding on the basis 
of an outpouring of empathy provide handouts based primarily on gene-
rosity.309 Giving to victims is not seen as an obligation in any strongly 
normative or formal sense, but as an act of virtue by donors. Some victim 
compensation funds, such as the September 11th Fund (not to be con-
fused with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund) set up by the 
New York Community Trust and United Way of New York City, col-
lected more than $500 million from more than two million donors and 
could be described as essentially an outpouring of ad hoc charity.310 Res-
ponding to criticism that compensation following the July 7 attacks in 
London was insufficient, defenders of the scheme argued that the sums 
received should not be seen as representing the value of the lives lost but 
as merely expressing “a token of public sympathy.”311 The fact that in 
some cases judicial review of the awards given through compensation 
schemes is excluded (e.g., in New York and Maryland) reinforces the 
sense that contributions are ex gratia and not susceptible to challenges.312 
Several US state legislatures have underscored that they hold, at most, “a 
moral responsibility” to assist crime victims while rejecting any stricter 
form of liability.313 Internationally, it is noteworthy that the preamble to 
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the UN Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture “recogniz[es] the need to 
provide assistance to the victims of torture in a purely humanitarian spi-
rit.”314 In a way, that provision seems designed to deny any sense of do-
nor obligation. 
The humanitarian rationale is, nonetheless, an insufficient characteriza-
tion of most domestic compensation schemes. As one author put it 
“[c]haritable institutions have never adopted a consistent policy toward 
victims of crime and, in light of the competing demands for their funds, 
to expect them to provide an effective solution to the problem is optimis-
tic.”315 Although victim compensation schemes may draw loosely on 
public generosity, they are not reducible to it. They are, to begin with, 
mostly publicly funded schemes and, therefore, integrated within the 
workings of the state. Although the public may support the work and 
think it falls within the duties of an empathetic state, compensation 
schemes are financed by taxation or public income, not donations from 
the general public. However incomplete compensation may be, and al-
though it may not be quite what victims might expect, it is typically 
granted on the basis of rules that emphasize the equality of all victims 
and their equal claim in case of equal harm to the resources of the 
scheme. In other words, unlike in a purely charitable arrangement, there 
is an “air of entitlement” about the assistance given.316 In fact, suggesting 
that victims receive charity may be “demeaning, unreliable, and inequit-
able.”317 The existence of public compensation funds is also generally 
held to be in tension with private charitable initiatives, in those rare cases 
where the two co-exist.318 
The idea of charity is a more plausible explanation for the TFV than it 
is in the domestic setting, because naturally, it is less expected interna-
tionally for an entity to assume the role of the state in relation to the con-
sequences of crime. First and foremost, contributions to the TFV are vo-
luntary.319 There is no “international community” budget that would be 
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regularly set aside to compensate victims of atrocities. The fact, as dis-
cussed above, that it is hard to tie compensation to a theory of obligation 
(on the part of the donors) or entitlement (on the part of the victims), 
makes it tempting to characterize compensation as the expression of a 
fundamental generosity of donors and the TFV. The TFV falls quite 
close to a charity, moreover, by accepting donations from private indi-
viduals,320 donations which are probably not that different from the ones 
the same actors might make to, for example, UNICEF or Oxfam. The 
TFV is, for all intents and purposes, already profiling itself on the donor 
market and objectively competing with other aid distributors.321 The fact 
that private donors (unlike public ones) can earmark a third of their con-
tributions for specific projects of the TFV suggests that donor priorities 
are given relatively strong recognition, a feature characteristic of charita-
ble arrangements.322 Moreover, not only is donating to the TFV discre-
tionary, but so are donations by the fund. The TFV has considerable dis-
cretion, which suggests it might emerge as a sort of benevolent but per-
haps somewhat capricious patron. 
However, there is something problematic about portraying the TFV as 
a “charity.” First, the TFV board is itself quite adamant that it is not a 
“charity.”323 What it means by that is not clear, but the impression is that 
the Board sees the Fund as more solemn, public, and institutional than a 
charity would be. Assistance by the TFV is, if not a right, given as a form 
of fundamental institutional recognition of harm. Moreover, it is granted 
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by an institution that is embedded in (even as it is independent from) the 
functioning of international criminal justice.324 Although the Fund is typ-
ically discreet about whether it will use some of its funds to complement 
reparation awards, this remains a possibility that tinges its activities in a 
more rights oriented direction than the language of charity suggests. 
States themselves have not particularly framed their donations as charity 
(although it is true they have not framed their donations as much at all). 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, victims’ groups in various coun-
tries where the TFV operates typically do not see themselves as “beg-
ging,” but as expressing, in various complex ways, a loose entitlement to 
assistance even outside the legal framework of reparation.325 Had the 
TFV merely been created as a further means of manifesting international 
donor virtue, it would no doubt have met a certain amount of ambiva-
lence by victims and NGOs alike. In fact, if the TFV were entirely 
viewed as a charity, then it might as well have been created entirely in-
dependently of the Court and its existence within the Rome Statute 
framework would be harder to justify. 
I. Moral and Equitable Rationale: The TFV as Redresser of Imbalances 
One traditional justification for the creation of victim compensation 
schemes is simply a “moral, realistic concern for the welfare of the in-
jured citizen.”326 That argument is sometimes expressed, particularly by 
victims’ rights groups, as the need to redress the balance between the 
accused and the victims.327 Although that argument can sometimes be 
injected with a taint of demagoguery, it rests on quite solid conceptual 
foundations and does raise complex questions, especially in an environ-
ment where the victim is wholly ignored. As Adolphe Prins famously put 
it at the Paris Prison Congress in 1895: 
The guilty man lodged, fed, clothed, warmed, lighted, entertained, at 
the expense of the State in a model cell, issued from it with a sum of 
money lawfully earned, has paid his debt to society; he can set his vic-
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tims at defiance; but the victim has his consolation; he can think that by 
taxes he pays to the Treasury, he has contributed towards the paternal 
care, which has guarded the criminal during his stay in prison.328 
Typically, some victims protest that considerable resources are being 
spent on behalf of the accused to ensure a fair trial, while only very mi-
nimal resources are being spent on them, except, for example, to the ex-
tent that their protection needs to be guaranteed for the purposes of the 
criminal trial.329 While victims may, more or less, gladly recognize the 
needs of the criminal trial and therefore the legitimate expenses asso-
ciated with protecting the rights of the accused, they argue that this is no 
reason to deny them various forms of compensation and argue in favor of 
more equitable budget allocations.330 
Another more profound rationale in the context of reparation is that 
there is no “moral merit” to having been the victim of a “rich” convict as 
opposed to a “poor” one and that all victims are equally deserving of re-
paration.331 The fundamental inequity of not receiving reparation because 
one’s tormentor is insolvent suggests a strong ethical case for sharing 
that burden to “smooth out” the differences that would result otherwise. 
This is also an argument in favor of extracting the quest for reparation 
from the tortious context, where victims’ hopes might otherwise lie. In 
doing so, the system intends to signal that obtaining reparation for harm 
suffered as a result of crime differs from seeking civil remedies for ordi-
nary harm. Rather than simply a private and relational issue between in-
dividuals, it involves more fundamental concerns of fairness, so that the 
usual justifications for victims shouldering the cost of tort litigation do 
not apply. As Garofalo once noted, “we are dealing here not with a ques-
tion of private law, but with a matter of justice and social security.”332 
Victims seeking compensation for crimes, in other words, are entitled to 
such compensation without having to go through the nuisance of litigat-
ing, as if their harm was a purely private issue. 
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Perhaps more fundamentally, being a victim means that one is, in most 
cases, innocent of anything that befell one. This fundamental innocence 
reinforces the moral case that the community should repair the inequity 
placed on a target of crime.333 Whoever else is responsible for a crime 
(apart from the accused or the state), it is certainly not the victims’ fault. 
The argument is further reinforced by the randomness of being a victim 
of violent crime (the “roulette” of crime).334 Violent crime is in the order 
of a calamity, one that could befall any of us, with potentially ruinous 
consequences. To suggest otherwise might lead to an implication that 
one somehow contributed to being victimized, which is, in most cases, 
unfathomable. Crime is, in other words, a cruel sort of lottery that is par-
ticularly bereft of any moral meaning, except that by not seeking to cor-
rect it the state, in a sense, ratifies the injustice and gives it a sort of im-
primatur. 
This reasoning paves the way to the so-called “shared risk” rationale 
for having victim compensation schemes. Advocates of this approach 
point out that “[r]ather than force individuals to pay for having been vic-
timized . . . everyone should share the risk engendered by society’s inep-
titude.”335 This position is sometimes analogized with the regime of 
products liability: “under modern products liability theory, the manufac-
turer is in the best position to absorb a loss by spreading it among all 
consumers by increasing prices. Similarly, the government is in the best 
position to disburse by taxation the losses incurred by victims of 
crimes.”336 More concretely, publicly financed victim compensation 
schemes might have a socially redistributive rationale in that they share 
the cost of crime with the whole of society where, in practice, certain 
groups are disproportionately vulnerable to it.337 
Without going into any details, one could probably make a Rawlsian 
argument that behind a veil of ignorance (i.e., not knowing how suscept-
ible to crime we might be), we would all opt for a system that compen-
sated us for the consequences of crime.338 Moreover, the moral case for 
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compensation is made even stronger by the fact that whereas the harm to 
victims is considerable, the cost to spread across society is arguably not 
that great.339 According to Bentham, for example: 
This obligation of the public to furnish satisfaction is founded upon a 
reason that has the evidence of an axiom. A pecuniary charge divided 
among the mass of individuals is nothing to each contributor, in com-
parison with what it would be to an individual or a small number. . . . 
[I]t seems impossible to give too much extension to a means so inge-
nious, which renders real losses so slight, and which gives so much se-
curity against eventual evils.340 
These equitable arguments undeniably had an impact in the ICC/TFV 
context. If the disproportion between the resources expended on the ac-
cused at the expense of victims is glaring domestically, it is even more so 
internationally. Certainly, in the context of the ICC the ratio of spending 
is deeply skewed against victims, even in the context of the current, rela-
tively progressive scheme. For example, the average budget spent by 
international criminal tribunals on one accused runs in the hundreds of 
thousands of dollars,341 while the TFV recently proudly heralded that it 
had spent on average five dollars on each victim.342 Equitable arguments 
are bound to be taken up more frequently internationally, especially as 
victims increasingly organize themselves and become better informed. 
The argument that there is no merit to having been a victim of a “poor” 
as opposed to a “rich” convicted person also militates in favor of the 
TFV occasionally supplementing reparation payments by the con-
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victed.343 The TFV also clearly has an internationally distributive dimen-
sion, in a context where, so far, all of the ICC’s prosecutions center on 
Africa (which arguably suffers disproportionately from atrocity crimes) 
and the vast majority of state donors are Western countries.344 Moreover, 
in the context of the ICC, the risk of such discrepancies also militates in 
favor of a policy of assistance rather than reparations-oriented compensa-
tion. Reparations have the disadvantage that they are only payable to the 
victims of the person convicted.345 For example, one author has already 
warned against the risk in Uganda that “[m]any victims . . . stand to be 
excluded from the ICC reparations process for having suffered the 
‘wrong’ crimes, committed by the ‘wrong’ perpetrators or at the wrong 
time.”346 Alternatively, assistance can be distributed to victims of 
“crimes” entering the Court’s jurisdiction, rather than victims of crimi-
nals prosecuted by it. 
Finally, the idea of the fundamental lack of victims’ blameworthiness 
for their fate is quite cardinal in the context of international criminal jus-
tice. The fact that one lives in a region of the world where mass crimes 
are committed is entirely irrelevant to assessing whether one “deserves” 
compensation. There is, furthermore, an extra moral argument in the 
ICC/TFV context, which has to do with the hyper-selectivity of the 
Court’s prosecutions and the fact that only very few accused will be 
tried.347 Needless to say, there is nothing particularly morally relevant 
about having been a victim of a person convicted by the Court as op-
posed to any other person. At least when it comes to its autonomous re-
sources, the TFV will probably see itself as having a clear mandate to 
“equalize circumstances” that will militate in favor of providing assis-
tance to the many rather than reparations to the few. Indeed, moves to 
use its relatively scarce autonomous resources to supplement reparation 
orders in favor of a minority of “super-victims” might create strong resis-
tance. 
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There is merit to this “equitable” account of the rationale for the TFV, 
but there are also problems with it. The argument that too many re-
sources are being spent on the accused as opposed to victims is proble-
matic because it suggests a zero-sum game, one where money spent on 
the criminal process is money taken away from victims. In practice, the 
arbitrage is much more complex, and victims may understand that proce-
dural safeguards afforded to the accused, however costly they may be, 
ultimately protect their own interests. If anything, to properly assess 
whether the international community’s distributive priorities are indeed 
skewed in favor of the accused, the right framework should be that of 
overall international spending. For example, one would need to compare 
judicial spending on the accused with the overall international and do-
mestic spending related to victim welfare and dignity in the same con-
text.348 The TFV itself, while it clearly seems to occupy a certain moral 
high ground (as exemplified, in particular, by the selection of a board 
composed of eminently respected individuals)349 does not particularly 
portray itself in equitable terms. 
J. Welfarist Rationale: The TFV as an Expression of Solidarity 
In view of the fact that states are unlikely to recognize contributions to 
the TFV as a form of acknowledgment of responsibility or victim rights, 
or as a form of charity or moral compulsion, a middle ground rationale is 
the idea of welfare. Welfare is based on a sense of obligation, but one 
that results neither from the virtue of the donor or the complications as-
sociated with the language of legal responsibility. Rather, the fundamen-
tal logic of welfarist justifications might lie in an emphasis on the needs 
of victims.350 Welfare oriented compensation schemes, in other words, 
are typically more associated with assistance than with reparations. Per-
haps the strongest argument in this respect is that although full repara-
tions may be ideal in theory, victims of grave crimes often cannot afford 
to wait to obtain those and should therefore be given assistance earlier 
rather than later.351 
Domestically, there is no doubt that “social welfare theory” has fea-
tured strongly as a ground for compensating victims. It has been de-
scribed by at least one author as “the most widely advocated basis for 
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victim compensation.”352 It is typically anchored in a strong concept of 
social solidarity which expresses the idea that compensation derives from 
the idea of “living together” and a collective assumption of risks (“club-
bing together” as Margery Fry described it;353 “communitarization” and 
“shared risk” as others have put it).354 After the oft quoted passage that 
compensation is ex gratia and the insistence on absence of responsibility, 
the authors of the 1964 British compensation program noted, “[t]he pub-
lic does, however, feel a sense of responsibility for . . . the innocent vic-
tim, and it is right that this feeling should find practical expression in the 
provision of compensation.”355 The European Convention speaks of “so-
cial solidarity” as a ground for compensation.356 The sense is that al-
though the terms “responsibility” and “duty” may be used quite widely, 
“these responsibilities and duties derive from the conditions of modern 
society and the grace of the state, not from a legally recognized liability 
in the relationship between the state and its citizenry.”357 
At a certain level, this view of compensation can be seen as taking se-
riously the idea that crime is committed against the collectivity. Where 
criminal justice traditionally uses that idea to craft a notion of crime as 
primarily an offense against the state which marginalizes victims, one 
can reverse the reasoning to suggest that it is precisely because crime 
affects the whole of society that society owes compensation.358 As the 
British Home Office explained when the UK victim compensation 
scheme was being implemented, the 
focus of concern is upon the common good and the idea that in the per-
son of the victim a harm is done to society which he or she has no duty 
to bear alone. Accordingly compensation is a means by which the loss 
                                                                                                             
 352. ELIAS, VICTIMS OF THE SYSTEM, supra note 20, at 25. 
 353. Fry, supra note 32, at 192. 
 354. Schultz, supra note 326, at 242 (“[C]ommon sense calls for grouping together for 
mutual protection through a system of shared risk in the area of victims of criminal vi-
olence.”). 
 355. HOME OFFICE, SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT, COMPENSATION FOR 
VICTIMS OF CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, 1964, Cmnd. 2323, ¶ 8 [hereinafter HOME OFFICE] . 
 356. European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes, supra 
note 45, pmbl. 
 357. Galaway & Rutman, supra note 4, at 63. 
 358. Interestingly, Jeremy Bentham identified one of the “cases in which satisfaction 
ought to be a public charge. . . . [as] losses and misfortunes in consequence of hostilities.” 
He went on to argue that “[t]hose who have been exposed to the invasions of a public 
enemy have so much the clearer right to a public indemnity, since they may be consi-
dered as having sustained a shock which threatened all the citizens.” BENTHAM, THEORY 
OF LEGISLATION, supra note 146, at 320. 
194 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:1 
is distributed across society as a whole, so recognizing the reality of so-
cial existence and deepening a sense of community.359 
This sort of rationale makes the most of an “embodied” concept of the 
common good, rather than considering that it always necessarily coin-
cides with the interests of the state in having certain crimes punished. 
Such a rationale is consistent with a view that sees crimes as an attack 
on society, but it then follows through by ensuring that all those affected 
(not personally, but as members of society) receive compensation (unlike 
traditional criminal law which used the conceit that crime was an attack 
on society and then avoided imposing any obligation on society in terms 
of assisting the victim). A central idea is that living in society involves 
risks that must be shared for the greater good of all. The welfare founda-
tion of victim compensation schemes also draws on a quite different but 
related, paradoxical idea. This idea is that crime is not only meted against 
society but that it is in a sense also produced by social life itself—“the 
idea that to some considerable extent we as members of society make 
possible the conditions under which crimes are committed.”360 Ascribing 
the occurrence of crime to society in general sets aside the vexed prob-
lem of state agency (Was the state negligent? Should it be liable merely 
as a result of a “social contract”?). There is something awkward, any-
how, about the social contract idea that the state “causes” the criminality 
that it fails to prevent. 
The “social” origin of crime is both more plausible and fairer as a con-
struct. It is, of course, tempting to say that crime is only the product of 
criminally-minded individuals but, without going into the whole free-
dom/determinism quarrel, it is fair to say that in a very literal sense, 
crime is produced by the fact of man living in society in a condition of 
perpetual interaction. This is the “sociological view” of crime, one that 
sees crime as being “the fault of society in general.”361 If one endows 
society with a sense of agency, the claim becomes that in a fundamental 
sense, one “who suffers the impact of criminal violence is also the victim 
of society’s long inattention to equality and social justice.”362 The result 
is that compensation is not simply a humanitarian or moral duty, but is 
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more generally an expression of public interest—of a society that in car-
ing for those who have been victimized, cares for itself. 
The welfare argument also accounts for why victims of crime specifi-
cally should be taken care of by society, as opposed to other categories of 
the population who are typically not protected from the ordinary vicissi-
tudes of life, such as natural catastrophes. Victims of crime stand in the 
company of a number of other special categories created by welfare ide-
ology, be they veterans, the unemployed, or the aged, who have been 
deemed worthy of solicitude for a variety of reasons.363 An analogy is 
sometimes drawn, for example, between victim compensation schemes 
and worker compensation programs (“affording equal benefits to the man 
who falls from a ladder at work and the man whose enemy pushes the 
ladder from under him at home,” as Margery Fry reasoned with her cha-
racteristic wit).364 The idea may be that one is being compensated for a 
man-made disaster (crime, unemployment) for which society, unlike nat-
ural catastrophes, feels at least minimally responsible. 
There are several signs that this welfare logic has been very significant 
domestically in the development of victim compensation schemes. This 
is reflected, first, in the nature of what is contributed to victims. As in the 
humanitarian logic, the emphasis in many domestic compensation 
schemes is on assistance rather than reparation. However, assistance is 
often of the sort associated with welfare rather than charity and relief, 
and might include rehabilitation, training, or loans.365 What matters is 
less the cause of the victim’s predicament (as with reparations), than the 
vulnerability of victims as persons, taking into account not just their 
present but also their future needs. In some cases, in a way reminiscent 
of many welfare schemes, compensation is “means tested,” so that the 
only victims who receive assistance are those facing, for example, “se-
rious financial hardship.”366 The idea is to help victims cope with ex-
penses arising out of injuries, for which they are not already covered by 
any existing welfare services.367 This also means that collateral recovery 
is generally prohibited so that one may not be compensated, for example, 
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through both a public scheme and insurance payments.368 This is quite 
different from the logic of reparations as of right, which are owed regard-
less of the means of the victim. 
Second, the idea of welfare is also a ground for giving, which is not 
strictly humanitarian or compassionate. Victim compensation schemes 
stand somewhere between the idea of charity as a manifestation of donor 
generosity and reparation as a victim entitlement. Assistance flows nei-
ther from criminal, civil, or administrative responsibility, but from a 
sense of social obligation. Even though it will often be the case that “vic-
tims of crime do not have a substantive right to the benefits created,” 
they will typically have “an expectation of receiving those benefits” to 
the extent available. 369 For example, the New Jersey Crime Victim’s Bill 
of Rights is typical in stating that a victim has a right to compensation 
“wherever possible.”370 Moreover, the tendency is for the community 
obligation towards victims to manifest itself in regular budgetary appro-
priations financed through some form of “involuntary” contribution, such 
as a tax.371 Margery Fry pointed out as early as 1957 that “the logical 
way of providing for criminally inflicted injuries would be to tax every 
adult citizen . . . to cover a risk to which each is exposed.”372 The state is 
in a unique position to absorb the cost of compensating victims through 
taxes, almost in the same way that under products liability theory the 
manufacturer will pass on the cost of liability through increased prices to 
consumers.373 Almost all victim compensation schemes are financed out 
of the state’s budget, whilst some are financed through direct levies. The 
French terrorist compensation fund (which is, characteristically, de-
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scribed as a fund “in the name of national solidarity”), for example, is 
financed by a levy on property insurance contracts.374 
Third, compensation is, unlike a purely charitable scheme, awarded in 
a systematic and consistent way, characteristic of the welfare state. Fund-
ing in favor of victims may be made ex gratia, but that does not mean it 
is capricious. Board members of the British scheme, for example, are 
“instructed and compelled to make payments to all who come within the 
ambit of the Scheme.”375 The technocratic leanings of many schemes are 
reinforced by the fact that awards are typically limited and standardized, 
rather than following the exact amount of harm, as would be the case in 
civil suits.376 Compensation is administered bureaucratically, for exam-
ple, by a board rather than the courts,377 and the trend has been towards 
severance of obvious ties with the judiciary.378 Finally, the welfare orien-
tation of several victim compensation programs is also underscored 
anecdotally by reference to programs in such terms. For example, certain 
federally supported victim programs are derogatorily referred to as “the 
Department of Justice ‘Food Stamp’ program,” and elicit the occasional 
hostility by those who see it as abrogating individual responsibility (e.g., 
to get insurance) and a “welfare attitude,”379 or even creating a risk of 
“moral hazard” (i.e., that victims knowing that they will be compensated 
will put themselves in danger’s way more willingly).380 
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The solidarist ethos, the idea that compensation is owed on the basis of 
a shared experience of living in society, is certainly an appealing ground 
on which to rest the foundation of the TFV compensation regime, not 
least because it lies somewhere at the intersection of advanced thinking 
about both criminal justice and the nature of the international system. 
Indeed, solidarity has been a buzz word in international legal circles for 
quite some time and was perhaps used most famously by Georges Scelle 
to describe the rising tide of international interdependence and its poten-
tial to change the nature of the international game.381 Several authors 
writing in the international reparation field have begun using the term 
“solidarity” as describing what lies at the heart of compensation to vic-
tims.382 
Solidarity also suggests a novel concept of international obligations 
towards victims, relevant when the international community cannot pos-
sibly be held directly liable, but where it is always at least a little respon-
sible—whether by omission, acquiescence, or insufficient resolve. In 
many ways, international crimes are the very product of international 
society: whether it be the cover traditionally provided by sovereignty, 
support for criminal regimes, the legacy of colonialism, economic dislo-
cation brought about by the international economic and financial archi-
tecture, or global indifference. International crime is both the antithesis 
of international society and a poisonous substance it seems to secrete at 
every turn. There is a very real way in which international crime is a 
consequence of international coexistence. 
Contributions to the TFV, then, rather than being seen as simply “ge-
nerous,” might be viewed as an expression of a radical form of suprana-
tional, transnational, and cosmopolitan solidarity—a recognition of how 
the fundamental interdependence of global social life also creates condi-
tions for its undermining. Moreover, rather than being entirely sui gene-
ris, TFV efforts should be seen as a specialized and somewhat idiosyn-
cratic part of a much larger trend towards international community pro-
vided “welfare” in various fields (development, health, food, water, envi-
ronment, etc).383 The solidarity thesis seems the most adept at explaining 
how the TFV can derive resources not only from states and international 
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organizations, but also private entities whose contribution is hard to sub-
sume under anything resembling a responsibility model. This is conso-
nant with and reflective of the deeper logic presiding over international 
criminal justice, namely that international crimes affect the whole of hu-
manity and not just, for example, the “international community” as a 
loose, somewhat theoretical superstructure.384 It is thus morally and juri-
sprudentially logical to allow not only states but also individuals, NGOs, 
and IGOs to contribute in ways that express that basic solidarity. 
The formulation of the TFV’s rationale in terms of welfare solidarity 
suggests that there could be a legitimate expectation of assistance, within 
the limits of the Fund’s resources, to cope with the consequences of 
crime. In this context, conservative warnings of “governmental paternal-
ism” and the abandonment of “individual responsibility” may sound par-
ticularly hollow on a global level, where there is simply very little that 
individuals could do to protect themselves from crime in advance. It may 
be that TFV generosity, especially if it is badly implemented, will lead to 
some of the negative effects that are at times associated with aid-
dependency (although the risk seems minimal given the ad hoc nature of 
the compensation provided). But it is unlikely that an international victim 
scheme would be fundamentally abused in the sense that people would 
expose themselves to serious crime simply to obtain compensation.385 As 
to the idea of a “moral hazard,” while perhaps of marginal relevance in 
the context of petty property crimes domestically,386 it seems truly un-
likely internationally that someone would risk being a victim of genocide 
because of an expectation of compensation. 
There is some evidence that the TFV might be headed in a broad wel-
fare oriented direction. For example, it has been suggested by the Coali-
tion for the International Criminal Court that “[a]lthough the assistance 
mandate is separate and different from the reparations mandate, a repara-
tions perspective must be applied in the design and implementation of 
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assistance projects by the Trust Fund.”387 In the same vein, it is some-
times suggested that “[a]s with reparations granted by the Court, the as-
sistance received by the victim should, as far as possible, also be a rec-
ognition of their rights.”388 While this conclusion may be based on a 
simplistic analogy with reparation and is not very clear in its reasoning, it 
suggests, quite characteristically, that assistance is in the nature of an 
entitlement, something similar to its status in the welfarist model.389 It is 
also revealing that there were at least discussions as to the possibility of 
the Assembly of States Parties making regular donations to the Fund.390 
This creates an interesting symbolic connection between the group of 
states from which most crimes entering the Court’s jurisdiction will 
emanate, and the issue of victim compensation. 
The principal limitation of the TFV from the point of view of the wel-
fare rationale is that unlike a proper victim welfare scheme, the interna-
tional regime is not presently—nor does it seem that it will be any time 
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soon—one that is financed on a compulsory or tax basis.391 This does not 
mean that there could not be a certain expectation that the “international 
community” would consistently rise up to the occasion and fund the TFV 
commensurate with the needs of victims of crimes entering the Court’s 
jurisdiction. But, failing that, the TFV’s financial fortunes risk uncertain-
ty, perhaps resembling more a public charity than the manifestations of a 
global system of welfare security in the making. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the lessons of domestic victim compensation schemes is that 
while the first years are often spent in relative anonymity and free of po-
lemic, the system invariably comes under pressure as the funds and the 
TFV’s mission became better known and demands for compensation 
grow.392 It is probably the case that the TFV is going through a rather 
blessed early period. But for all its victim-friendly mandate and efforts to 
portray it as such, there will come a point where the gap between availa-
ble funds and existing needs, as well as the glaring disparities between 
different victim communities, will create calls for greater transparency 
and accountability. At that point, the TFV will have to rest its action on 
clearer theoretical footing than it has done so far. 
In the foreseeable future, and partly as a result of pressures from vari-
ous constituencies (the Assembly of States parties, donors, international 
and domestic victims rights’ organizations), the TFV will continue to 
fluctuate between the polar opposites of reparation and assistance, donor 
generosity, and victim entitlement—especially if a strong conceptual 
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map remains absent. Neither of these polarities are exclusive in theory, 
of course, but it is open to question whether the TFV will ever have the 
funds to both complement reparation orders and develop an assistance 
policy worthy of that name. Moreover, although having the TFV is cer-
tainly an improvement over a regime with only reparations ordered by 
the Court, one of the lessons of even welfare-oriented victim compensa-
tion schemes is that these have not escaped some of the very criticisms 
that are levied at the judicial system, including selectivity in the choice 
of victims and lack of clarity in the logic of disbursements.393 
This Article reviewed the emergence of domestic victim compensation 
funds in search of clues as to the proper theoretical foundation of the 
TFV. It concludes that some are clearly more relevant than others, but 
that ultimately, the TFV is very much a sui generis organ. Its justification 
should be understood as a mix of rationales, allowing for the fact that the 
TFV can, at this stage, engage in a variety of policies and strategies. The 
TFV, like domestic compensation schemes, is a reaction to limitations of 
the criminal system and is inclined towards restorative justice, even as it 
seeks to correct the fact that the convicted will often not have the capaci-
ty to compensate the harm caused by their crimes. The TFV is certainly a 
product of political forces and can be put to political uses, but that is a 
more factual than normative judgment. The TFV is a substitute to other 
mechanisms, such as insurance or tort, not so much because these might 
fail as because they do not seem to exist or have their place in the current 
international system.  
At any rate, none of the above explains why the Fund and its interna-
tional sponsors should take on the responsibility of compensating vic-
tims. The idea of “state” or “international community” responsibility as a 
ground for compensation is interesting, but the practice of the Fund sug-
gests no assumption of responsibility for the occurrence of international 
crimes. Internationally, the idea of a “right to reparation” was certainly 
very influential in the emergence of a strong compensation regime and is 
important in the context of the ICC. It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the TFV will see its proper role as guaranteeing a certain level 
of reparation, as opposed to pragmatically distributing rehabilitative ser-
vices to large victim groups. In practice, the TFV has already begun ac-
tively spending its meager budget on assistance and one wonders, given 
the present needs of victims, about the wisdom of provisioning funds to 
guarantee reparation awards beyond what the accused can pay. Reserving 
funds for reparations may have the effect of freezing them for substantial 
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amounts of time at the expense of projects that could be undertaken here 
and now.  
Social contract theory provides a broad and elegant rationalization for 
compensation, but its transposition to the international plane is a concep-
tual stretch. The international community is certainly taking on more re-
sponsibilities in terms of guaranteeing a certain level of security, but it is 
difficult to say the failure to protect populations against certain interna-
tional crimes now creates a political obligation to provide reparations and 
assistance. Humanitarian arguments make too much of the notion of 
charity, and victims are likely to want assistance in the wake of mass 
atrocities to be more than a manifestation of donor virtue. There is cer-
tainly some sense to the moral argument that victims should not shoulder 
the cost of crime alone, but this only explains how, not why, the TFV 
should spend its funds. Welfarist arguments are perhaps the most con-
vincing, especially in understanding the sort of “assistance” provided by 
the Fund to victims, but are limited by the fact that for all intents and 
purposes, the States Parties to the ICC cannot be said to assume the role 
of a welfare state in relation to victims. 
The resolution of the tension between these potential rationales for the 
work of the TFV will partly depend on evolving concepts of international 
criminal justice and compensation. From a criminal justice point of view, 
the TFV is the first international consecration of a rising domestic trend 
to take victims into account; at the same time, it also cruelly underlines 
the inherent limits of criminal justice and the extent to which both crimi-
nal and tortious responsibility are ultimately unsuited to the enormity of 
the reparatory task. The effort to uncover a satisfying rationale for the 
work of the Fund underscores a fundamental tension between reparations 
and assistance: the more law, justice, and rights oriented models see 
compensation as primarily about reparations; the more morality, politics, 
or welfare oriented models see compensation as primarily about assis-
tance. Given the TFV’s mandate to engage in both, but mindful of the 
limits on its resources, choices will have to be made at some point in the 
Fund’s existence. 
Beyond the issue of how the TFV should use its resources, the effort to 
uncover a rationale for its work also underscores the importance of who 
should give resources and on what basis. From the point of view of inter-
national justice, the TFV is a manifestation of, but also crucially depen-
dent on, a feeling of international solidarity. The international communi-
ty is somewhat stuck between an increasing assumption of powers and 
representation that it will guarantee a certain minimum public order de-
void of mass crimes, yet tempted to see the issue of compensation as one 
of merely generosity. The TFV will test the international community’s 
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commitment to victims as one of the crucial indicators of successful in-
ternational and transitional justice. Thinking about the proper rationale 
for compensation will be crucial to orient TFV practices in the right di-
rection. 
